AWA: Academic Writing at Auckland

Prison privatisation, or the establishment of private prisons, is a growing governmental agenda throughout the western world. As the name suggests, private prisons are owned and operated by private entities. Prison privatisation, then, is the contractual process whereby correctional responsibilities and functions are shifted from the public sector to the private. While this agenda arose in different western nations during different periods, it can be attributed to a primary cause – soaring prison populations. In response to increasing fear of victimisation in the United Kingdom, United States and New Zealand, governments have pandered to growing public fear and populist rhetoric on crime (Pratt and Clark, 2005). The response was fixed, stricter legislation, which also reduced judicial discretionary powers. Prison populations soared, and continue to increase throughout each western nation, increasing the financial burden on governments (Ludlow, 2014). As the privatisation agenda grew in other industries as a result of the neoliberal economic reforms, it well and truly extended to correctional settings. The argument is that like the industries aforementioned, the private sector can run prisons at less cost and more efficiently than governments. While arguably true in some aspects, this comes at a cost. This text will argue against the extension of privatisation and private ownership to incarceration. In doing so, the economic arguments of cheapness, efficiency and competitiveness will be critically analysed. This will be followed by the political, theoretical and philosophical concerns that arise with prison privatisation.

Proponents of private prisons argue that they are less costly and more efficient than the public operated prisons. Research tends to support the arguments that governments are unable to finance, site and construct prisons as efficiently and cheaply as the private sector (Austin and Coventry, 1999). This can be attributed to political constraints halting governments from swift construction and extension of prisons, including voter approval and construction bonds (Austin and Coventry, 1999). Private prisons do not necessarily require a mandate, and circumvent the accountability issues faced by the public sector. This efficiency and cheapness is supported by Austin and Coventry’s (1999) research on private prison options for the District of Columbia’s Department of Corrections, which confirmed that the private sector could construct bed space more cheaply and efficiently than the public sector (p.185). This is also the case for extending bed space and operational costs. In the United States, private entities circumvent labour costs by employing non-unionised as opposed to unionised workers, who tend to be employed by the public sector (Harding, 1999). Because there is a general consensus that private prisons are indeed cheaper to run, operate and maintain, it enables proponents to argue that such prisons reduce expenditure of tax-money, which likely increases its popularity amongst voters (Harding, 1999). However, the main reasons for cheaper costs are undesirable, and can paradoxically have opposite effects.

The primary objective of the private sector is to maximise profitability. This is no different in incarceration and correctional facilities. Unlike the efficiency which this motive tends to produce in utilities and banking, it incentivises reduced expenditure on important services. This can and has led in the past to reduced quality on rehabilitative, medical and food services (Ludlow, 2014). Given the so-called war on drugs, this can be detrimental to inmates suffering drug-addictions. Whether drug addiction is a criminal offence or disease is contentiously debated. Regardless of one’s standing, adequate rehabilitation is needed to prevent addicts from recidivism, an inherent objective of incarceration. Also concerning is that substance-abuse is comorbid with other mental illnesses such as anxiety and depression, which require adequate rehabilitation services (Evans, 2002). Private entities also rely on prisoners to make a profit, another disincentive to rehabilitate individuals and reduce recidivism. This has led to overcrowding in the past and poorer conditions, as evidenced by the Independent Monitoring Board’s 2007 report of HM Birmingham Prison, operated by G4S (Ludlow, 2015).

This is exacerbated by reduced expenditure on staff, especially security personnel. Without the stricter constraints holding state prisons accountable, private firms have employed inexperienced, under-educated and poorly-trained staff. Such personnel are employed in lesser numbers too. In the past, this has led to riots, infighting, corruption and even prisoners escaping, as evidenced by Mt Eden Prison and Kingman Prison. While operated by Serco, there were frequent ‘fight clubs’ that took place in Mt Eden Prison due to a lack of and inadequate supervision. Some inmates incurred serious injuries (Jones, 2016). Worse was the example of Kingman Prison in Arizona, operated by Management and Training Corporation, where three murderers escaped due to inadequate security (Ludlow, 2015). Given that the origins of modern private prisons are public demand for ‘safer communities’, reduced expenditure in these areas show contradictions in contracting out correctional services.

Another common argument for private prisons is that competitiveness encourages innovation in incarceration. Rather than reducing expenditure on important services, it could be counter-argued that entities seek to improve standards so as to ensure contract renewal. But unlike other industries, the market for prisons throughout the west is not competitive. In 2010, 75% of the United States market share was held between Wackenhut Corrections Corporation and Corrections Corporation of America (Ludlow, 2014). This lack of competitiveness is also pronounced in the United Kingdom, with Serco and G4S dominating the market, and expanding internationally (Ludlow, 2015). Compounding this lack of genuine competition is lobbying.

The increasing power of lobbyists with the development of free-market capitalism and globalisation may compel governments to loosen contracts. Absence of adequate contractual supervision has resulted in unsatisfactory conditions throughout the history of private prisons, including the examples aforementioned. Austin and Coventry (1991) discuss how loose contractual supervision in the United States has led to inhumane conditions and the exploitation of prisoners and workers in the past. With the increasing power of the private sector in the criminal justice system, there is a potential danger of the state losing its ability to enforce strict contracts, making the private sector increasingly unaccountable over time. In spite of this, proponents of private prisons would argue that accountability is not necessarily an issue, and is justifiable provided punishment is administered harshly.

There are significant philosophical issues with prison privatisation. The first is that it contradicts the philosophy on which the current criminal justice system is based upon – right realism. This is the approach to criminal justice which advocates long and tough sentencing (White, Haines & Asquith, 2012). It arose in response to populist rhetoric and widespread fear of crime victimisation (Bradley and Walters, 2011). Right realists would argue that ownership of prisons is irrelevant provided that criminals are harshly punished, which the government has a mandate to carry out. The issue is here is that the purpose such rhetoric is to keep communities safe. So, such a mandate entails the prioritisation of reducing recidivism, which again requires adequate rehabilitative services (Genders, 2003). The profit motive contradicts this, indicating that prison privatisation contravenes the philosophy which it arguably derived from.

Another concern is the general direction of the criminal justice system, and whether private prisons are a deviation from this. Western justice and democracy are based on core classicist principles – the social contract and the rule of law. The social contract is an agreement between members of a society to form a state that will protect citizen’s liberty, rights and property. If the state ceases to fulfil these obligations, then it becomes illegitimate (Ashcraft, 1991). Because private prisons are inherently incentivised to reduce costs and maximise profit, they are fundamentally in contradiction of an inherent state function. The past human rights abuses committed in private prisons also breach the rule of law, as soft contractual obligations can and have led to the administering of arbitrary punishment (Jing, 2010). With globalisation increasing and state autonomy decreasing, there is a risk of deviating further from these fundamental principles.

In challenge to that perspective, it could be argued that the private prison agenda is a symbol of progression as opposed to a deviation from core democratic principles. Efficiency, something which the free-market has successfully produced in most industries, is extending to corrections. While the private sector’s efficiency in other industries has encouraged progression, its extension to the criminal justice is arguably a step too far. An example of this is the proposed criminal justice reform in New Zealand. In 2010, Minister of Justice Simon Power proposed radical changes to simplify and fasten the criminal procedure ("‘Significant stoush’ ahead", 2010). The proposal obliged defendants to disclose evidence before the trial and assist in the prosecution process, which is a violation of the principle of ‘being innocent until proven guilty’. While the proposal was scrapped, it again may indicate a broad departure from fundamental liberal values in the name of efficiency.

Although private prisons are generally cheaper to run than public prisons, this comes at a significant cost. In arguing against the extension of the private sector to incarceration, this text critically analysed the cost and efficiency arguments for private prisons, the profit-motive, and the competitive aspect of private prisons. This was followed by the political, theoretical and philosophical issues with this process. Because private prisons are an ineffective response to soaring prison populations, they should be abolished or renationalised. While there is no clear solution to the public rhetoric driving the increase of prison populations, a starting point is increasing the input of criminologists into criminal justice policy. Overall, while the private sector is a pivotal aspect in the economy, its extension to the criminal justice system is a step too far.

Bibliography

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