AWA: Academic Writing at Auckland
Title: Korean War and New Zealand
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Copyright: Anonymous
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Description: To what extent did New Zealand participate in the Korean War? What concerns motivated this participation? How has our involvement in this conflict influenced our current relationship with the Republic of Korea?
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Korean War and New Zealand
The Korean War began in 1950 when North Korea invaded the Republic of Korea (ROK), lasting for three years and ending in a truce in 1953 with a Final Armistice Line being drawn at the 38th parallel. New Zealand's (NZ) hefty investments in this war stemmed from a variety of reasons, and the returns was a bedrock upon which a relationship with the Republic of Korea (ROK) was built; the war continues to influence the relationship today, predominantly in terms of its mutual economic benefit and the diversity Korean culture brings to the ethnoscape of NZ. NZ was one of the first countries to respond to the United Nations' (UN) call for support for the ROK, and joined the war as part of their forces, lead by the United States (US). Over the course of the war, they sent a Kayforce comprising of two frigates commandeered by 1350 men from the Royal New Zealand Navy, a ground force of 1000 men, and the 16 Field Regiment, totalling to roughly 5000 participants overall; of those, 33 were killed, 79 were wounded, and two were taken as prisoners of war. This was a proportionally huge contribution by NZ because the Kayforce was regarded as the third largest component of the UN forces (McGibbon 2013, 17). Furthermore, after the signing of the Armistice in 1953, NZ maintained contact to assist the ROK with its post-war situation. Economic support was given through both the New Zealand Council for Organisations of Relief Services Overseas, whose contributions amounted to $750,000 worth of supplies (Wells 2013, 13), and a donation of $500,000 between 1950 and 1955 through the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Program (Simkin 1999, 56). To ensure the Armistice held in Korea, New Zealanders were and still are a part of the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission; this currently amounts to 4 New Zealand Defence Force personnel (NZDF 2014). Considering that the two countries had no prior engagements, NZ's extent of participation both during and after the War was therefore astoundingly massive relative to other countries, albeit it wasn't a large contribution for them: the forces comprised a small percentage of a small country's population, which stood at 1,939,000 as of 1951 (SNZ 1951, under "Population"). NZ had three primary reasons for joining the War. The first was geopolitical, in that the Korean War could be seen as a clash between political ideologies. Communist North Korea was backed by the Soviet Union and China, and the ROK was supported by democratic Western powers including the US, which intensified Cold War tensions between the powerhouses. The prospective symbolism of communism dominating democracy and its implications wasn't lost on many countries, including NZ, who believed that there was an imminent need to secure the Asian front from a 'domino effect' of communism that could result from a North Korean victory; thus, they supported the ROK. A second reason lay in NZ's position as a founding member and ardent supporter of the UN: they had joined the war to substantiate the efficacy of collective security, upon which they heavily relied upon for security, and to advocate institutional structures that created an international rules-based environment in which NZ wouldn't be marginalised; the hope was that other governments would follow suit. By defending the ROK, they proved that they were capable of keeping their word and deserving of other nations' support. As a small and geographically isolated country, it was important for NZ to establish relationships that connected them to the rest of the world for self-defence, therefore by proactively engaging with the UN and its activities, NZ could simultaneously build bilateral relationships with member countries whilst upholding international order to ensure their safety. The war also provided NZ with an opportunity to secure the US as a new defensive partner because Britain had demonstrated an inability to defending her territories when they conceded Singapore to Japan in 1942. Prior to the war, the two countries and Australia were in negotiations for a formal regional security treaty in the Asia-Pacific, with the US being reluctant to join because they didn't see a need for one (USDS, n.d.). Despite defensive reassurances, NZ and Australia considered the treaty as an essential insurance policy against attacks and valued the stabilising effect it would exert through having a democratic powerhouse invested in the region to forestall communism. Thus, when the Korean War began, NZ took the opportunity to show its faith in the US and demonstrate their capabilities as an ally by supporting ROK with them, which earned NZ reciprocal trust; this, in conjunction with the war's communist implications, the fall of the Kuomintang, and the rise of the Chinese Communist party in 1949, eventually convinced the US of a need for a defence treaty, and thus ANZUS was signed in 1951. The establishment of first direct contact between the two countries during the war created the foundation for a relationship. As a direct result of the war, the Koreans were immensely thankful for the support and it was their gratuity combined with a need to establish international support and a strong economy that lead to persistent efforts in broadening international relations (Simkin 1999, 58). However, the monotony of the stalemate during the war soured NZ's interests in Korea, to the point where the war was often referred to as the "forgotten war" fought by a "forgotten force" (McGibbon 1996, 370); this meant that ROK had to take the initiative in forging a relationship. This was evident when General Park Chung Hee reached out to NZ in 1961 and sent their ROK Vietnam ambassador, Dr. Choi Duk Shin, to discuss the military coup and the possibility of diplomatic relations (McGibbon 2013, 20). NZ's reluctance in furthering the relationship beyond being wartime allies was due to the political and economic instability of Korea, the seemingly authoritarian and dictatorial regime of General Park, and a general lack of interest (McGibbon 2013, 17-19; Simkin 1999,38). Their hesitation caused the delay of official diplomatic recognition until 1962, and the building of an embassy in Seoul until 1971, but once formalities had been established, further connections opened up. One point of connection between NZ and the ROK was and is through education, which commenced with the accession of the ROK to the Colombo Plan in 1962 (The Colombo Plan Secretariat n.d). The programme involved British Commonwealth states providing developmental assistance to Asian countries to raise their standard of living and forestall communism; for NZ, this meant accepting around 300 Korean students throughout the 1960s and 70s into NZ universities, which was favourable for the ROK because of the industrial growth it brought (Wells 2013, 11). NZ was still hesitant about strengthening the relationship, but were nonetheless compliant as they had to uphold their Cold War duties. Eventually, they warmed up when the ROK became a potential trading partner and saw the relationship as a gateway to trade, therefore due to the mutual benefit, the educational tie was maintained throughout the years to the point where it was cemented at a policy level by the signing of the Education Cooperation Agreement in 2009. Presently, it has culminated in the ROK becoming NZ's 4th largest source of international students (NZFAT n.d.), which contributed $2.6 trillion to NZ's gross domestic product in 2014 (ENZ 2015).
With the impending secession of Britain to the European Union, which came to pass in 1973, NZ needed to diversity their markets. During the late 1960s, the ROK's economy grew rapidly in their transition from import-substitution to export-oriented industrialisation through both financial aid from the US and the opening of markets by the Vietnam War (Stubbs 1999, 337; Simkin 1999, 64-65), and NZ saw their potential as a trading partner. This formed the rationale behind the 1967 trade agreement that was launched through the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) (Simkin 1999, 62). As a result, NZ exports to the ROK reached $1.7 million in 1971, compared to an abysmal £16,000 in 1957 (McGibbon 2013, 18); thereafter, the flourishing relationship prospered, which lead to the signing of a free trade agreement in 2015 that has since elevated the value of two-way trade to $4.6 billion, and earned the ROK's status as NZ's 6th largest export market (NZFAT n.d.).
These educational and trade links also had an effect on both permanent and temporary migration between the ROK and NZ; the increase in the amount of interpersonal contact exerted a positive feedback effect on migration which also deepened the relationship on a personal level. Building on the success of the Colombo Plan, Asian studies had been introduced to New Zealand universities and high schools by the late 1960s in an effort to understand more about Asia, and more exchange programmes emerged, including Teach and Learn in Korea and the Working Holiday Scheme. This exposed New Zealanders to Korean culture and vice versa, which promoted NZ tourism to the point where the ROK became the 7th largest source of overseas visitors (NZFAT n.d.) and was responsible for an expenditure totalling $1.1 billion in 2016 (MBIE 2017); consequently, NZ became home to over 30,000 Koreans as of 2013, creating the largest expatriate Korean community in the world on a per capita basis. Other than the economic profit, the mass migration contributes to the heterogeneity of NZ's ethnoscape, but through its diversity it is also challenging the historical ideas of NZ identity and culture.
The Korean War may not feature prominently in NZ's history, but its influences can be traced throughout history to their manifestation in the economically beneficial and respectful relationship between the two countries today. As time passes, the effect of the war will diminish, but the relationship that stands today is solid despite the initial setbacks, and will continue to last as new connections are forged and refined with the ROK. References ENZ (Education New Zealand). 2015. Factsheet: Korea. New Zealand: Education New Zealand. https://nziec.co.nz/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Factsheet-Korea.pdf
McGibbon, Ian. 2013. “The Impact of the Korean War on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between New Zealand and the Republic of Korea.” New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies 15 (2): 15-23. http://www.nzasia.org.nz/journal/jas_dec2013_mcgibbon.pdf MBIE (Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment). 2017. Key Tourism Statistics. New Zealand: Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment. http://www.mbie.govt.nz/info-services/sectors-industries/tourism/documents-image-library/key-tourism-statistics.pdf NZFAT (New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade). n.d. “Republic of Korea (South).” Accessed September 20th, 2017. https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/countries-and-regions/north-asia/republic-of-korea-south/ NZDF (New Zealand Defence Force). 2014. “Overseas Operations: South Korea.” Last modified 13th October 2014. http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/operations/korea/default.htm Simkin, Ben. 1999. "New Zealand Relations with Korea, 1962-1971: From Backward Looking to Forward Looking." In New Zealand and Asia: Perceptions, Identity, and Engagement, edited by Yongjin Zhang, 53-76. Wellington: Asia 2000 Foundation of New Zealand, New Zealand Asia Institute (University of Auckland). SNZ (Statistics New Zealand). 1951. The Official New Zealand Year-Book, 1950. Wellington: Government Printer. https://www3.stats.govt.nz/New_Zealand_Official_Yearbooks/1950/NZOYB_1950.html Stubbs, Richard. 1999. "War and Economic Development: Export-Oriented Industrialisation in East and Southeast Asia." Comparative Politics 31 (3): 337-355. Accessed 21st September 2017. http://www.jstor.org/stable/422343 The Colombo Plan Secretariat. n.d. "Member Countries." Accessed 5th October 2017. http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/book/ed17/part3/ch14/psec084.html USDS (United States Department of State). n.d. "Milestones: 1945-1952 - The Australia, New Zealand and United States Security Treaty (ANZUS Treaty), 1951." Accessed September 14th, 2017. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/anzus Wells, Kenneth. 2013. "New Zealand and Korea in the Pacific: The Growth of a Partnership." New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies 15 (2): 3-14. http://www.nzasia.org.nz/journal/jas_dec2013_wells-1.pdf |