SEARCH PAPERS   

AWA: Academic Writing at Auckland

About this paper

Title: How far can the DPRK be considered communist?

Argument essay: 

Argument essays argue for a position, usually stated in the introduction. They may consider and refute opposing arguments.

Copyright: Jack Adams

Level: 

Second year

Description: Tutorial report. DPRK: communist? Authoritarian/ totalitarian?

Warning: This paper cannot be copied and used in your own assignment; this is plagiarism. Copied sections will be identified by Turnitin and penalties will apply. Please refer to the University's Academic Integrity resource and policies on Academic Integrity and Copyright.

Writing features

How far can the DPRK be considered communist?

The extent to which the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) may be considered a ‘communist’ country depends on the point of reference when discussing ‘communism’ as a guiding principle. Although the DPRK was authoritarian in its execution, it led with the influences of various interpretations of communism.

The context behind the DPRK’s implementation of nationalism may be understood to be vaguely communist. Kim’s assent to power comes after a particularly brutal civil war, following an international conflict that shook the Korean colonial predicament. Before World War II, Korea had largely been under colonial rule. Subject to foreign imperialism for much of its modern history, the end of the war posed a fertile environment for an ideology, particularly Leninism, to fester. In Kim’s mind, nationalism would act as a unifying force for those in the DPRK in order to remonstrate any remnants of Japanese rule. Vladimir Lenin’s book ‘Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism’ embodies this notion, allowing people to unite under the deposition of colonial rule. Foreign nations were seen as a force of exploitation, acting as a symbol for the decadence of capitalist values. This nationalism, with regards to Lenin’s interpretation of communism, may show the DPRK as a communist nation.

Within this nationalism, the notion of a dualistic oppression runs true in both Marxism and Kim’s DPRK. Within Marxism, the concept of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie as the oppressed and the oppressor, respectively, is compatible with the distinct opposition between those Kim considered ‘Korean’ and those considered foreign imperialists. However, Kim’s idea loses compatibility with Marxism through the idea of ambiguous or arbitrary identities. The conception of the ‘worker’ and the ‘upper-class’ are fairly easily defined. This may be based on societal treatment or income. Kim’s efforts to define society by national identity is an arduous and unfruitful task. Even using Stalin’s definition of national identity, the criteria are unclear. Kim Il-Sung’s ‘Juche’ speech consolidated a twist on Stalin’s ruling. Defining geographical boundaries might be a simple task, but uniting language and cultural differences failed to present a reasonable standard for what may define a ‘Korean’ or an ‘imperialist’. Language is a particularly difficult matter to reconcile due to the breadth of rhetoric and the dialects of the same language. Despite the similarities between the conceptions of the oppressed and the oppressor, Kim fails to define readily who may be considered an ally of the nation. Therefore, not being compatible with Marxism, the DPRK may not be considered communist.

Kim’s collectivisation followed similar principles to the Marxist interpretation of communism. Having adopted collectivisation, the very idea of giving food to the state encouraged a nation-wide economic movement, which also assisted in supporting this nationalistic principle enforced by Kim. The speed of implementation of these new policies also reflects the forms of communism that were present in China and the Soviet Union. Leninism supported the inorganic development of revolution, conveying an encouragement for the revolution of workers to happen now, instead of generations beyond. The rate at which agricultural workers became part of a state collective projects the acceleration proposed by Kim. By 1956, ‘95.6 percent of all North Korean peasants were members of agricultural collectives’. The DPRK’s focus on ‘flying horse’ policy and the subsequent influx in industrial development similarly fits in with a Marxist and Maoist form of communism. Kim’s implementation of incentives, whether or not realistic, is very similar to the five-year plans adopted by Stalin, along with the Stakhanovite movement. Marx’s notions of economies of scales stated that economic progress came through the rhetoric that bigger is, in fact, better. Crop efficiency and industrial progress was instigated by the expansion of the means of production.

Mao’s radicalism and Lenin’s perspective of communism permeate through these policies, however the degree that they represent communism is farfetched due to its distance from Marx’s view of organic social development towards communism.

The DPRK’s communist disposition is challenged by the incompatibility between crop types and Marx’s preference for economies of scale. Certain crops, such as rice, functioned better with limited size and private ownership. Making larger paddy fields does not cause greater yield from crops. Even the deconstruction of the landlord model within Korea further supports this. As landlords were forced to split their land amongst their clients, the title deeds were then passed on, thus enforcing proprietary interests, instead of discouraging private ownership. The way many areas of land were treated rejected the potential for communism to be implemented within the DPRK.

Some elements of the DPRK are reminiscent of the authoritarian or totalitarian regimes, strictly opposed to the communist ideology that is often associated with Marx. Kim’s cult of personality is particularly reflective of Stalinist totalitarianism. One historian referred to Kim Il-Sung new Stalinism as ‘socialism in one family’. This almost monarchic model forming a mythological legacy of the Kim family. Exaggerated stories of Kim’s military efforts show a willingness to formulate a significant reputation in order to create an artificial respect and affection across a nation. The ascending leaders of the DPRK proved to be familial (Kim Jong-Il and Kim Jong-Un). Ironically, this Democratic system, met with 99 percent public satisfaction, shows a nepotistic system which runs parallel to the authoritarian methods. Efforts of interior control were also implemented. The State Security Department fits in with much of the same espionage principles followed by renowned authoritarian leaders of the twentieth century, such as Hitler’s Gestapo or Stalin’s KGB. Much of these acts of social control contradict the humanitarian values associated with Marx’s perception of communism, particularly the subjugation of the worker under the government and degradation of the regular individual.

The DPRK’s shift to form a ‘socialist’ nation is a fairly ambiguous matter. Taking communism to be under the original Marxist manifestation, the DPRK fails in many of the key principles that guide Marxism, especially in the DPRK’s distinct lack of attention to the worker, with pressure diverted from worker superiority to a refreshed nationalism and national superiority. However, in the more divorced interpretations of communism, and socialism in some cases, the DPRK follows many of the key features, especially in the adoption of Maoism, Stalinism, and Leninism. With hindsight, it may be more appropriate to call the DPRK a totalitarian or authoritarian state, as to not conflate Kim’s legacy as one that was following Marx’s communism.