AWA: Academic Writing at Auckland

Politics in late 19^th Century America during the Gilded Age has long proved to be a fascinating area for historians to study. As the country’s “national obsession,” no other period in American political history has been quite like it.[1] It was a complex time of intense partisanship, epic struggles between the Democratic Party, Republican Party and Third Parties, mass political participation and mobilisation of the general population and of course, an era of immense corruption and the attempts at reform. As a result, an abundance of deeply rooted stereotypes emerged which have informed how Gilded Age politics are conventionally viewed and present a challenge for historians. Consequently, their responses and rebuttals to these stereotypes have contributed to an interesting and varied historiography. Hence, by critically reviewing and assessing this literature on Gilded Age politics, it is possible to come to a conclusion regarding both the merits and shortcomings of the narrative within the historiography as it developed over the years.

To begin with briefly, the dominant narrative in the historiography of Gilded Age politics has been overtly negative and proven to have much resilience. It is a narrative forged primarily by the historians of the Progressive Era, who were eager to disparage much of what they had seen. Historian after historian routinely passed critical judgment and set the tone for how the period would be typically perceived. For example, Henry Adams deemed that politics in the Gilded Age “was poor in purpose and barren in results.”[2] Furthermore, Matthew Josephson claimed that the Democrats and Republicans were one and the same, indistinguishable entities who were solely concerned with serving corporate interests and used partisanship to divert the attention of the general population.[3] It is from such observations that the major stereotypes of Gilded Age politics were created and reinforced. In short, it is because of the work of Progressive historians that the standard was set for Gilded Age politics as an age of “corruption, profiteering, and false glitter.”[4]

Thus, the historiography of Gilded Age politics has essentially been a story of coming to terms with this blunt analysis of the period. Was it fair to say that politics wholly consisted of the stereotypes where leaders sprouted endless nonsense and party bosses manipulated behind the scenes amidst a sea of corruption?[5] This has been the image which historians over the past decades have spent evaluating and pushing back, beginning with a great deal of work in the 1960s. Stanley P. Hirshson’s Farewell to the Bloody Shirt was one of the first to take a different tact and reveal that Gilded Age politics was not a faceless monolithic entity. Instead of focusing on the usual general accounts of politics, he dealt with how the Republican Party confronted the vexing question of African Americans in the South.[6] By doing so, he reveals a party at war with itself, pitting those who genuinely cared about African Americans against those who wanted to control the black vote and Mugwumps who thought African Americans should be abandoned altogether.[7]

Clearly, this is a break from how historians used to just focus on unscrupulous politicians and demonstrates that there was diversity and political engagement in a time supposedly paralysed by a lack of it. Yet, it must be noted, Hirshson still conceded that this struggle ended in a way that was “politics as usual.”[8] His approach of tackling a specific issue and revealing diversity in the process is followed by Irwin Unger’s The Greenback Era. Here, Unger argued that financial debates lay at the heart of Gilded Age politics and consumed the nation’s attention.[9] In the process, he sheds light on an American society not dominated solely by Democrats and Republicans, but one riddled with cleavages spanning between urban and rural, local and national, as well as agrarian and industrial America. These ideas are reiterated in a similar work by Walter T.K. Nugent in Money and American Society. He exposes an America contested economically by the proponents of gold monometallism, silver bimetallism, free silver and greenbackism.[10]

Combined, these two works really illustrate how Gilded Age politics was more than a simply a plethora of stereotypes. The battles and debates over financial policy really did “[engage] the contending worldviews of the members of society” and allow them to participate in political discourse.[11] John G. Sproat’s The Best Men is another work which shows this from a different angle. He picks up on the point that

Gilded Age politics was not simply “an orgy of self-indulgence” but a period which saw immense change throughout America, going so far as to criticise Adams for “relegating most postwar politicians to a gallery of monsters.”[12] He critiques the liberal reformers, ostensibly the stereotypical “good guys” fighting corruption and argues that they and especially the Mugwumps were shrewd elitist political operators who had their own agenda to implement.[13] Hence, Sproat exposes the danger of reading Gilded Age politics too superficially and provides good caution that stereotypes are not all that they seem.

Additionally, H. Wayne Morgan reaches the same understanding from yet another route in his work Hayes to McKinley. He is most adamant that the stereotypes which made “every businessman a robber baron and all politicians humbugs” were gross oversimplifications.[14] Through his review of national politics, he shows that Gilded Age politics were far from static and points to the emergence of a comprehensive national party system. More importantly, he does not acknowledge the corrupting influence of corporate interests as being relevant and challenges the notion that Democrats and Republicans were identical. Under Morgan’s analysis, Republicans proved themselves much more successful than their Democratic counterparts. This is reflected in his praise of Republicans such as Hayes, Blaine and McKinley and criticism of Democrats like Cleveland.[15] In fact, Morgan’s work makes a good contrast to Hirshson when demonstrating dynamism in Gilded Age politics: where Republicans fell out over the treatment of African Americans, they could also come together to perform as a whole on the national political arena.

However, several works which approach the Gilded Age as a whole counter-balance this development in historiography and reinforce earlier negative perceptions. One such example is Robert H. Wiebe’s seminal The Search for Order. Not only did he agree with what Progressive historians had said before, he also generated findings of his own which have since become the standard interpretation. He argued that the irrelevancy of the executive branch in Gilded Age politics was matched by the indifference of the general population, and that real power lay with the corruption-inducing political machines and patronage of the party bosses.[16] Instead, intense partisan politics was the “grand recreational device” used to placate the masses and enable “coarse leadership and crudely exercised power.”[17] This was wholeheartedly agreed on by Ari and Olive Hoogenboom in The Gilded Age. In particular, they draw upon a memorable description of the authority of the party bosses, saying how they had “reduced to a science the knack of dominating men.”[18]

Clearly, the literature on Gilded Age politics during the 1960s constituted some form of pushback against the dominant narrative espoused by the Progressive historians. Nevertheless, the degree of this pushback depended very much on how historians chose to approach the topic. Those who focused on specific political issues could successfully show that it was not just all a period of stereotypes. Conversely, if the study of politics was included in a general overview of the entire Gilded Age, then the negative stereotypes are only further emphasised. Interestingly, the historians all use the same methodology. In general, they opt for a top-down approach, concentrating solely on the leaders of the time and ignoring whatever sentiments that the general population might have held, leaving out valuable evidence and creating gaps in their arguments. Overall, the dominant stereotypes may have been challenged but still continued to exist. Indeed, writing in the 1970s, Geoffrey Blodgett commented how the “progressive-liberal interpretation” of Gilded Age politics showed “remarkable resilience” in the face of this attempted shift in historiography.[19]

Yet this dominant narrative did inevitably yield to historiographical change over the next few decades as revisionist historians came out in fuller force. For instance, Blodgett refers to the groundbreaking scholarship in the 1970s by historians such as Paul Kleppner. In The Cross of Culture, Kleppner showed that the general population was mainly politically motivated by ethno-cultural values, making Gilded Age politics much more local and rendering stereotypical generalisations “more hazardous than ever before.”[20] These values transcended the usual use of class and economic conflicts to describe events such as the rise of Populism. A.E. Campbell also performs another localised revisionist take in America Comes of Age, viewing Gilded Age politics as a dynamic battlefield between politicians and reformers.[21] He argues that there was actual merit to the historically much derided spoils system whereby political machines rewarded allies after electoral victories: it could shut out potentially troublesome political enemies from office and it provided a vital connection between the nationally-orientated politicians and their locally-orientated supporters.[22]

Furthermore, Blodgett praises Wiebe for characterising Gilded Age politics as a “search for order” rather than a “dark prelude” to the Progressive Era.[23] This dichotomy can be represented by two contrasting studies on public political participation written in the 1990s. Mary P. Ryan’s Civic Wars argues that so brutal were Gilded Age politics that it saw the decline of what were once vibrant local civic societies. Previously, cities such as San Francisco, New York, and New Orleans were public spaces which accommodated differences and fostered robust debate.[24] Ultimately, the rise of political machines and special interest groups took its toll on this civic society, replacing what she calls “meeting place democracy” with the far more confrontational “politics of publicity.”[25] On the other hand, Mark Wahlgen Summers claims in The Gilded Age that this was not necessarily a bad thing at all: instead, this brand of politics became the “biggest participatory and spectator sport,” engaging the general population and involving men and women of every race like never before.[26]

As such, revisionism from the 1970s onwards within the historiography on Gilded Age politics has plainly made some headway as part of the trend towards balancing the Progressive Era’s interpretation. Although historians have accepted the crassness of Gilded Age politics as a given, they agree that simple stereotypes no longer sufficed and that it was possible to reinterpret negatives into positives. Additionally, methodology used to study Gilded Age politics saw a transformation as well, with historians realising the merit of approaching the subject matter from the bottom-up and examining the actions of the general population. In a field like politics, this is significant as what happened at the local grassroots level was equally as important as what was going on at the decision-making national level. This has been accompanied by a change in the use of evidence, with more visual evidence like images and tables providing for varied reading. Effectively, this signals that movements in the literature begun in the 1960s have continued to be consolidated and built upon.

In fact, this has practically become the norm in the most recent decade of historical writing on Gilded Age politics. The work of Charles W. Calhoun is a good representation of this successful shift in historiography and provides an update on the status of the literature. He confirms the now standard point about the dangers of oversimplification but more importantly, cites the emergence of a new line of thinking that the Gilded Age and the Progressive Era possessed actual political continuity and were not two completely separate entities.[27] He noted that this was brought about by historians switching their attention onto matters of public policy, as they affected the country far longer than short-lived political corruption and scandals.[28] This was fully explored in his work From Bloody Shirt to Full Dinner Pail. Harkening back to Morgan’s reassessment of Gilded Age leaders, once ineffective and weak presidents like Hayes, Cleveland and McKinley are reimagined by Calhoun as men of vision who helped pave the way for the expansion of the presidency under Theodore Roosevelt.

Still, the case for this realignment in historiography must not be overstated as historians do continue to support the dominant Gilded Age political narrative. In another work, Party Games, Summers highlights the ugly side of Gilded Age politics. He argues that by design the political system allowed Democrats and Republicans to cling to power and manipulate it extensively, both against each other and also to neutralise external threats such as the challenge by the Populists.[29] In a twist on Lincoln’s famous words, Summers states that the system was basically one “of the politicians... by the politicians and for the politicians.”[30] Finally, standing defiantly in front of historians who would argue that there were positives to Gilded Age politics is Jack Beatty’s Age of Betrayal. In a throwback to Wiebe and Josephson’s previous indictments, Beatty’s interpretation returns the period once more back to a time where it all went wrong, where the corporations ruled supreme and any pretensions of democracy were lost to the corruption and influence of money.

What this goes to show is that despite increasing signs pointing to the contrary, the essence of the dominant narrative and stereotypes in the literature on Gilded Age politics remain very much alive. That being said, historians at least agree on how to examine the subject matter: whilst not all works adopt a wholly bottom-up approach, it is most certainly the case that historians are no longer confined solely to studying the actions of the elite in society. Disagreement exists regarding where to place the balance between revisionists and detractors within the historiography. Yes, there is merit to the revisionist argument that Gilded Age politics engaged the general population to an unprecedented degree. However, caution must be taken lest this pushback becomes exaggerated, along the lines of Worth Robert Miller’s overblown lament for the passing of the Gilded Age political era.[31] Such historians are getting ahead of themselves in their rush to revise what the detractors still correctly identify as the crudeness of Gilded Age politics.

In conclusion, it is clear that the historiography of Gilded Age politics has evolved over the years to a certain point. Historians have gradually moved away from the dominant narrative of the Progressive Era and now generally accept the fact that the period has unjustly been “painted in the darkest hues imaginable.”[32] Whether by looking at Gilded Age politics from the top or bottom, they have amassed plenty of evidence to comprehensively rebut the idea once and for all that the Gilded Age can be explained away with simple stereotypes. However, although the battle against stereotypes has been won, the concrete truth behind them cannot be denied. That is why the pushback against the dominant narrative is not total: the balance is still hard to find and represents the barrier which the literature must overcome in order to reach a richer and more nuanced interpretation. Hence, the years which “[bridged] the age of Lincoln and Roosevelt” endure as a vibrant era that continues to both intrigue and appall historians at the same time.[33]

Bibliography

An Associate of the Boston South End House. ‘Where the Real Contest Occurs’, in Ari Hoogenboom and Olive Hoogenboom, eds, The Gilded Age, New Jersey, 1967, pp.151-155.

Beatty, J. Age of Betrayal: The Triumph of Money in America, 1865-1900, New York, 2007.

Blodgett, G. ‘A New Look at the Gilded Age: Politics in a Cultural Context’, in Daniel Walker Howe, ed, Victorian America, Philadelphia, 1976, pp.95-108.

Calhoun, C.W. From Bloody Shirt to Full Dinner Pail: The Transformation of Politics and Governance in the Gilded Age, New York, 2010.

Calhoun, C.W. ‘Reimaging the “Lost Men” of the Gilded Age: Perspectives on the Late Nineteenth Century Presidents’, The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, 1, 3, July 2002, pp.225-257.

Calhoun, C.W. ‘The Political Culture: Public Life and the Conduct of Politics’, in Charles W. Calhoun, ed, The Gilded Age: Essays on the Origins of Modern America, New York, 2005, pp.185-214.

Campbell, A.E. America Comes of Age: The Era of Theodore Roosevelt, New York, 1971.

Hirshson, S.P. Farewell to the Bloody Shirt: Northern Republicans and the Southern Negro, 1877-1893, Indiana, 1962.

Miller, W.R. ‘The Lost World of Gilded Age Politics’, The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, 1, 1, January 2002, pp.49-67.

Morgan, H.W. From Hayes to McKinley: National Party Politics, 1877-1896, Syracuse, 1969.

Nugent, W.T.K. Money and American Society 1865-1880, New York, 1968.

Ryan, M.P. Civic Wars: Democracy and Public Life in the American City during the Nineteenth Century, Berkley, 1997.

Sproat, J.G. “The Best Men”: Liberal Reformers in the Gilded Age, New York, 1968.

Summers, M.W. Party Games: Getting, Keeping and Using Power in Gilded Age Politics, Chapel Hill, 2004.

Summers, M.W. The Gilded Age, or, The Hazard of New Functions, New Jersey, 1997.

Tindall, G.B. and D.E. Shi, America: A Narrative History, New York, 1996.

Unger, I. The Greenback Era: A Social and Political History of American Finance 1865-1879, New Jersey, 1964.

Wiebe, R.H. The Search for Order 1877-1920, New York, 1967.

[1] Worth Robert Miller, ‘The Lost World of Gilded Age Politics’, The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, 1, 1, 2002, p.49.

[2] George Brown Tindall and David E. Shi, America: A Narrative History, New York, 1996, p.926.

[3] Miller, p.50. 

[4] Tindall and Shi, p.926.

[5] Mark Wahlgren Summers, The Gilded Age, or, The Hazard of New Functions, New Jersey, 1997, p.181.

[6] Stanley P. Hirshson, Farewell to the Bloody Shirt: Northern Republicans and the Southern Negro, 1877-1893, Indiana, 1962, p.251.

[7] ibid., pp.10-12.

[8] ibid., p.99. 

[9] Irwin Unger, The Greenback Era: A Social and Political History of American Finance 1865-1879, New Jersey, 1964, p.3.

[10] Walter T.K. Nugent, Money and American Society 1865-1880, New York, 1968, pp.33-43, 241.   

[11] ibid., p.274.

[12] John G. Sproat, “The Best Men”: Liberal Reformers in the Gilded Age, New York, 1968,pp.vii, 278.

[13] ibid., p.115.

[14] H. Wayne Morgan, From Hayes to McKinley: National Party Politics, 1877-1896, Syracuse, 1969, p.v.

[15] ibid., pp.56, 194-195, 203, 483.

[16] Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order 1877-1920, New York, 1967, pp.27-36.

[17] ibid., p.37.

[18] An Associate of the Boston South End House, ‘Where the Real Contest Occurs’, in Ari Hoogenboom and Olive Hoogenboom, eds, The Gilded Age, New Jersey, 1967, p.151. 

[19] Geoffrey Blodgett, ‘A New Look at the Gilded Age: Politics in a Cultural Context’, in Daniel Walker Howe, ed, Victorian America, Philadelphia, 1976, pp.96-97.

[20] ibid., p.99.

[21] A.E. Campbell, America Comes of Age: The Era of Theodore Roosevelt, New York, 1971, p.49.

[22] ibid., p.50. 

[23] Blodgett, p.102. 

[24] Mary P. Ryan, Civic Wars: Democracy and Public Life in the American City during the Nineteenth Century, Berkley, 1997, pp.96-98.

[25] ibid., p.259.

[26] Summers, p.179. 

[27] Charles W. Calhoun, ‘Reimaging the “Lost Men” of the Gilded Age: Perspectives on the Late Nineteenth Century Presidents’, The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, 1, 3, 2002, p.225.

[28] Charles W. Calhoun, ‘The Political Culture: Public Life and the Conduct of Politics’, in Charles W. Calhoun, ed, The Gilded Age: Essays on the Origins of Modern America, New York, 2005, p.186.

[29] Mark Wahlgren Summers, Party Games: Getting, Keeping and Using Power in Gilded Age Politics, Chapel Hill, 2004, pp.x, 277.

[30] ibid., p.17.

[31] Miller, p.67.

[32] Calhoun, The Gilded Age, p.185.

[33] ibid., p.209.