AWA: Academic Writing at Auckland

Since the onset of reform and modernisation and the “opening up” of China from 1978 onwards, Chinese foreign policy has changed dramatically.[1] Chinese foreign policy can be first and foremost characterised by a strong focus on and prioritisation of the economy. Chinese foreign policy and process can also be characterised by a strong trend towards pragmatism and pluralism. Lastly, Chinese foreign policy can be characterised by a strong anti-hegemonism and sensitivity to sovereignty and territorial integrity (seen in the ongoing issue of Taiwan), and by the promotion of “regional multilateralism.”[2]

Since 1978, China has pursued “one of the most economically focused foreign policies in the world.”[3] Under the leadership of Mao Zedong before his death in 1976, China pursued a policy of self reliance according to the principles of communism, and viewed international markets with suspicion.[4] Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping after 1978, China pursued an “open door” policy of modernisation and integration into the world economy that has characterised Chinese foreign policy ever since.[5]  China entered institutions like the World Bank and World Trade Organisation and integrated itself into the world’s capitalist economy, while remaining politically socialist.[6] China’s growth rates have continued to increase at around 7-8% per year, largely due to foreign investment.[7] Economic growth and the continued pursuit of it forms the basis of both foreign and domestic strategy for China: economic development is generally accepted to be the ‘ultimate solution’ (genben chulu) to all problems both internally and externally.[8] China’s foreign policy in particular has changed dramatically since China’s integration. China’s agenda for stability and security is explicitly correlated with its economic growth. China therefore has restrictions on its foreign conduct as well as incentives to conform to international norms in terms of its policies and economic systems.[9] China’s economically focused strategy has been a great success, transforming China into a competitive economic world power.[10] Overall, the focus on economic factors in Chinese foreign policy is strongly related to the trend of pragmatism, whereby foreign policy is pursued with a constant mind to furthering China’s economic development. [11]

Pragmatism in current Chinese foreign policy is strongly contrasted with the pre-1978 ideologically based strategy.  In the Mao era, communist ideology was a base of legitimacy for the un-democratically elected government.  China approached international relations as an ideological battlefield against class enemies; this was reflected in China’s confrontational foreign policy before 1978.[12] However, once priority was given to the economy, a peaceful and prosperous international environment became vital to China’s interests.[13] Under Deng, pragmatism became the core of foreign policy decision making.[14]  Foreign policies now reflected China’s desire to facilitate stability and economic growth.[15]  China under Deng also realised that a comprehensive security strategy, including military modernisation, was not possible without a strong economy.[16] Pragmatism is “ideologically agnostic” and firmly centred around national interest.[17] Indeed, relations with many major powers were improved and normalised post-Mao mainly due to the need to maintain economic growth: the new criteria for legitimacy in the non-ideologically based government.[18] The driving force behind pragmatism in Chinese foreign policy is nationalism.  Zhao refers to it as a ‘double edged sword’: nationalism ensures the Chinese people’s support of pragmatic measures that will ultimately strengthen China, but it can also be a source of dangerous sentiment favouring a more assertive foreign policy.[19] Ultimately though, Chinese leaders dismiss suggestions of a more assertive China, and nationalism is not an overwhelmingly negative or worrying characteristic of Chinese foreign policy.[20] [21]

An extension of pragmatic strategy can be seen in the trend towards pluralism in foreign policy decision making, that is, allowing experts and research institutes a role so as to facilitate economic development.[22] Pre- 1978, professional input was largely prohibited; during the Cultural Revolution in the 1960’s the foreign ministry all but ceased to operate.[23] Greater uncertainties and challenges resulting from the end of the relatively straightforward bilateral tensions of the Cold War have resulted in a more complicated foreign policy environment.[24]  Liao describes the shift in the decision making process as being from ‘centralised elitism’ to ‘pluralistic elitism’: while the decision making process is still dominated by the elite in the government and military, there has been a horizontal shift towards including think tanks and analysts outside of the top leadership.[25]  A  small elite could no longer handle the complicated foreign policy demands of the post-Cold War era, and in general the foreign policy process has become more rational and systematised.[26] Both Liao and Craig-Harris argue that greater pluralism was an inevitable consequence of the open door policy which resulted naturally in a wider and more liberal range of viewpoints;  though it would be too strong a statement to say that political liberalisation (by Western standards) is a characteristic of the Chinese foreign policy process.[27] [28] Instead, it is fair to say that the influence of Chinese think tanks on policy making has increased, but the dominance of the power elite remains unchanged.[29]

One characteristic of Chinese foreign policy that is staunchly its own is China’s firm opposition to hegemonism, and its acute sensitivity to the issues of territorial integrity and sovereignty.[30] One of China’s main goals is to achieve great power status; this derives from Chinese nationalism.[31] However, it then follows that China does not want to be subjugated by other powers, its history particularly in the 18^th century of colonial powers and their dominance over China is still viewed with resentment and humiliation.[32] China is therefore strongly in favour of a policy of ‘non-interference’ and very sensitive to what it perceives as violations of its sovereignty.[33] In particular, the Taiwan issue remains the most critical issue in both China’s security strategy and Sino-US relations.[34] [35] While peace is critical to China’s economically focused foreign policy, Beijing has made it clear that reunification with Taiwan will be achieved using force if necessary, and the U.S’s policy of continuing to sell arms to Taiwan has strained diplomatic relations.[36] Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao stated recently that this “violated China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity” and had caused “serious disturbances” to the diplomatic relations of the two countries.[37] China’s reaction to the perceived threat of Western interference is creating foreign policy problems even outside the realm of government; this year internet giant Google stated that it would pull out of China unless censorship of its information ceases. [38] China has made it plain it “abhors US hegemonism” and China’s position on the Taiwan issue remains a critical characteristic of their current foreign policy.[39]

China’s anti-hegemonist stance and strong distaste for unipolarity has influenced what Xu Xin argues is a “paradigm shift in [China’s] basic approach to international relations...a redefined approach to seeking great power status.”[40] China is strongly in favour of a multipolar world to balance off perceived US hegemony.[41] China emphasises mutual respect for sovereignty and non-interference.[42] In recent years especially China has focused on expanding its power in the Asia-Pacific region, following the world trend towards developing regional blocs focusing on economy and trade (e.g. NAFTA, the EU).[43]China has adopted a policy of ‘good neighbourliness’ in its surrounding region and increased relations in particular with ASEAN, as well as  increased its participation in UN activities.[44] While some countries in the region distrust China and are wary of the “China threat” theory, China’s economic strength could make it a “pillar of regional stability” that would counter any trust issues as well as interference from other powers.[45] Eventually this economic strength may lead to enough mutual benefits between China and ASEAN countries that ideology will play less of a factor and economics will dominate.[46] China’s interest in influencing this region has even resulted in some flexibility on the Taiwan issue; China has accepted Taiwan’s separate economic region at APEC.[47] China’s increased participation in both international and regional affairs are again characteristic of its pragmatism, but the recent emphasis on “regionalised multilateralism”[48] is a different approach to seeking power: while China intentionally acts as an economic facilitator in the region resulting in its enhanced power status, it nonetheless rejects the notion that hegemonism must inevitably follow.[49] Indeed, China’s promotion of a multipolar world became symbolically apparent to the world in 2003, when the broadcast of China’s first manned space flight showed the astronaut holding two flags up side by side:  the flag of the People’s Republic of China, and the flag of the United Nations. “This gesture goes beyond sheer symbolism... [A message that] China is rising and keeps the UN centred international community in mind.”[50] This is a characteristic of Chinese foreign policy that will have strong implications both for China, its region, and the world in the coming years.[51]

Since the onset of reform and modernisation and the “opening up” of China in 1978, characteristics of Chinese foreign policy have changed dramatically. Chinese foreign policy can be predominantly characterised by a strong focus on economic modernisation, and by related trends of pragmatism and pluralism in decision making which prioritise China’s security and development through economic growth. Additionally Chinese foreign policy can be characterised by strong anti-hegemonism and sensitivity to sovereignty and territorial integrity, resulting in tensions regarding the Taiwan issue. Lastly, China externalises its anti-hegemonic stance in its foreign policy by promoting multipolarity and regionalised multilateralism, representing a new approach to seeking power.

Bibliography

Books

Barnett, A.D. The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process. Boulder: Westview Press, Inc, 1985.

Chan, Gerald.  Chinese Perspectives on International Relations.  Great Britain: MacMillan Press Ltd; New York: St Martin’s Press Ltd, 1999.

MacDougall, Derek. Asia Pacific in World Politics. Boulder; London. Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc, 2007.

Liao, Xuanli. Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks and China’s Policy Towards Japan. Hong Kong. Chinese University Press, 2006.

Book Chapters: Edited Book

Craig-Harris, Lillian. “Directions of Change.” In Chinese Politics and Foreign Policy Reform, 256-273 Edited by Gerald Segal, London: Kegan Paul International Ltd, 1990.

Domenach, Jean Luc. “Ideological Reform.” In Chinese Politics and Foreign Policy Reform, 19-37. Edited by Gerald Segal, London: Kegan Paul International Ltd, 1990.

Krug, Barbara. “Economic Reform.” In Chinese Politics and Foreign Policy Reform, 61-77. Edited by Gerald Segal, London: Kegan Paul International Ltd, 1990.

Ledic, Michele. “Foreign Economic Relations.”In Chinese Politics and Foreign Policy Reform, 230-56. Edited by Gerald Segal, London: Kegan Paul International Ltd, 1990.

Leong, Ho Khai. “Rituals, Risks and Rivalries: China and ASEAN.” In Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behaviour. Edited by Suisheng Zhao, 297-309. New York; London: M. E. Sharpe, Inc, 2004.

Long, Simon. “Political Reform.” In Chinese Politics and Foreign Policy Reform, 37-61. Edited by Gerald Segal, London: Kegan Paul International Ltd, 1990.

Yang, Jian. “China’s Security Strategy and Policies.” In Asian Security Reassessed. Edited by Stephen Hoadley and Jurgen Ruland, 86-105. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006.

Zhao, Suisheng.  “Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behaviour.”In Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behaviour. Edited by Suisheng Zhao, 3-23. New York; London: M. E. Sharpe, Inc, 2004.

Zhao, Suisheng. “Beijing’s Perception of the International System and Foreign Policy Adjustment after the Tiananmen Incident.” In Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behaviour. Edited by Suisheng Zhao, 140-151. New York; London: M. E. Sharpe, Inc, 2004.

Journal Articles

Shambaugh, David. “China’s International Relations Think Tanks: Evolving Structure and Process.” The China Quarterly 171 (2002):575-596.

Papers presented at a conference

Rozman, Gilbert. “China’s perspective on the World”. Paper presented at the International Workshop on External Strategy of the New Chinese Leadership for the Japanese Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo, Japan, Feb 9-10, 2004.

Xin, Xu. “China’s Approach to Multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific: A Path to China’s Peaceful Rise.” Paper presented at the International Workshop on External Strategy of the New Chinese Leadership for the Japanese Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo, Japan, Feb 9-10, 2004.

Magazine Articles

Anonymous. Not pointing or wagging but beckoning: Chinese foreign policy. The Economist Vol 394, Issue 8674, 2010, p47-48.

Kristof, Nicholas. Could Google Bring Freedom to China? New York Times Upfront. Vol 142,  April 5^th 2010.

[1] MacDougall, Derek. Asia Pacific in World Politics. Boulder; London. Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc, 2007. pp 54-55

[2] Xin, Xu. “China’s Approach to Multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific: A Path to China’s Peaceful Rise.” Paper presented at the International Workshop on External Strategy of the New Chinese Leadership for the Japanese Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo, Japan, Feb 9-10, 2004. p10

[3] Liao, Xuanli. Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks and China’s Policy Towards Japan. Hong Kong. Chinese University Press, 2006. p1

[4] Krug, Barbara. “Economic Reform.” In Chinese Politics and Foreign Policy Reform. Edited by Gerald Segal, London: Kegan Paul International Ltd, 1990. p66

[5] Domenach, Jean Luc. “Ideological Reform.” In Chinese Politics and Foreign Policy Reform. Edited by Gerald Segal, London: Kegan Paul International Ltd, 1990.pp 19-25

[6] Krug, 1990. pp66-68.

[7] MacDougall, 2007. p58, p63

[8] Yang, Jian. “China’s Security Strategy and Policies.” In Asian Security Reassessed. Edited by Stephen Hoadley and Jurgen Ruland, 86-105. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006. p92

[9] Zhao, Suisheng.  “Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behaviour.”In Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behaviour. Edited by Suisheng Zhao. New York; London: M. E. Sharpe, Inc, 2004. p3

[10]Chan, Gerald.  Chinese Perspectives on International Relations.  Great Britain: MacMillan Press Ltd; New York: St Martin’s Press Ltd, 1999. p69

[11]Long, Simon. “Political Reform.” In Chinese Politics and Foreign Policy Reform. Edited by Gerald Segal, London: Kegan Paul International Ltd, 1990. p37

[12] Domenach, Jean Luc. 1990. p21, 27

[13] Domenach, Jean Luc. 1990, p27

[14] Long, 1990. p51

[15] Ibid, p37

[16] Yang, 2006. p87

[17] Zhao, 2004. “Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behaviour.”p4

[18] Yang, 2006. p103

[19] Zhao, 2004. “Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behaviour.”p7

[20] Anonymous. Not pointing or wagging but beckoning: Chinese foreign policy. The Economist Vol 394, Issue 8674, 2010,  p47-48.

[21] Zhao, 2004. “Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behaviour.”p7

[22] MacDougall, 2007. p53

[23] Shambaugh, David. “China’s International Relations Think Tanks: Evolving Structure and Process.” The China Quarterly 171 (2002). p578

[24] Liao, Xuanli. Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks and China’s Policy Towards Japan. Hong Kong. Chinese University Press, 2006. p27

[25] Ibid, p1, p7.

[26] Barnett, A.D. The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process. Boulder: Westview Press, Inc, 1985. p3

[27] Liao, Xuanli. Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks and China’s Policy Towards Japan. Hong Kong. Chinese University Press, 2006. p49

[28] Craig-Harris, Lillian. “Directions of Change.” In Chinese Politics and Foreign Policy Reform, 256-273 Edited by Gerald Segal, London: Kegan Paul International Ltd, 1990. p256

[29] Shambaugh, David. p58

[30] Yang, 2006. p96

[31] MacDougall, 2007. p65

[32] Yang, 2006. p96

[33] Zhao, “Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behaviour.”p5

[34] Yang, 2006. p92

[35] Zhao, “Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behaviour.”p15

[36] Yang, 2006, p90-92.

[37] Anonymous, 2010. p47-48

[38] Kristof, Nicholas. Could Google Bring Freedom to China? New York Times Upfront. Vol 142, April 5^th 2010.

[39] Yang, 2006. p96; Zhao, “Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behaviour.”p5

[40] Xin, Xu, 2004. p9

[41] Yang, 2006. p96

[42] Zhao, “Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behaviour.”p5

[43] Zhao, Suisheng. “Beijing’s Perception of the International System and Foreign Policy Adjustment after the Tiananmen Incident.” In Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behaviour. Edited by Suisheng Zhao, New York; London: M. E. Sharpe, Inc, 2004. p145

[44] Ibid, p145-148

[45] Rozman, Gilbert. “China’s perspective on the World”. Paper presented at the International Workshop on External Strategy of the New Chinese Leadership for the Japanese Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo, Japan, Feb 9-10, 2004.p4

[46] Leong, Ho Khai. “Rituals, Risks and Rivalries: China and ASEAN.” In Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behaviour. Edited by Suisheng Zhao. New York; London: M. E. Sharpe, Inc, 2004. p395-396.

[47] Zhao, Suisheng. “Beijing’s Perception of the International System and Foreign Policy Adjustment after the Tiananmen Incident.”p145

[48] Xin, Xu, 2004. p10

[49] Rozman, 2004. p3

[50] Xin Xu, 2004. p8.

[51] Ibid, p9.