AWA: Academic Writing at Auckland

Consequentialism is a branch of normative ethical theories that defines morality solely as that which achieves the best possible consequences. Consequentialism can be further separated into different categories, including classical act utilitarianism [CAU]. This approach hedonistically aims to maximize pleasure (utility) and decrease pain with each action in an impartial and aggregative manner, meaning that everyone’s happiness is equal, and pain can be outweighed by pleasure. Despite being challenged by many strong arguments, CAU remains popular due to a common belief that “the ultimate good is something that most people actually desire”[1] . However, many who oppose it argue that because it is aggregate in addition to being maximizing, that it may lead people to commit injustices in the pursuit of pleasure. This is referred to as the “Injustice” objection, which states that CAU appears to justify imposing or allowing harm to befall some in order to achieve greater pleasure for others, as illustrated in figure one (of the appendix). In response to this, classical act utilitarian’s generally offer three arguments. The first response is that long term consequences prevent us from committing injustices, meaning that the injustices themselves would cause pain over an extended period of time that would outweigh the initial pleasure. The second response is one made by J.S. Mills, who proposes that actions in general be subject to a collection of moral principles designed to promote pleasure without causing pain, in known situations. The third response is commonly referred to as the “bite the bullet” [BTB] response, stating that our “moral common sense”[2] is often unreliable, and that injustices remain justifiable so long as the pain of those injustices are still outweighed by pleasure[3]. This essay will describe the BTB response in more detail, before arguing that despite being the best defense and the injustice objection, it does not succeed in defending CAU completely.

The BTB is slightly unconventional in comparison to other arguments in defense of CAU, but is the only one that strongly defends its position. Unlike the first two responses which uphold “ordinary notions of justice [and] human rights”[4] at the cost of CAU’s maximizing and aggregate aspects, this response directly defends it against the injustice objection. It states that regardless of any injustices that may occur, it is always better to maximize pleasure and that justice and human rights should be sacrificed if necessary to promote pleasure. This makes it the best defense of CAU itself, as other responses to the injustice objection, particularly Mill’s secondary principles, instead seem to favor other types of consequentialism.

            However, although BTB is the best defense against the injustice objection, it also illustrates one of CAU’s biggest flaws, that it also promotes “bad pleasures”[5] in addition to good pleasures, at the cost of pain or injustice. An example of this is a real life case in which a woman visited a police station to file charges of assault, and was then directed to undress and pose indecently while a male police officer took photographs of her for personal pleasure, which he later shared with his colleagues[6]. This example is defensible under CAU, as although the pleasure the male officers received was in itself bad, it can be assumed that it still outweighed the pain of the victim, and in similar cases where the victim may not know of the existence of such photographs, there would be no pain involved. Furthermore, BTB as opposed to other responses to the injustice objection only supports the actions of the male officers, as it does not consider human rights to be of greater importance than pleasure itself. This shows that the BTB response to the injustice objection does not adequately defend CAU, as its hedonistic nature can be used to promote pleasures that do not in any way aid society, but rather can degrade it in favor of less pleasures[7].

            Although the BTB response reveals CAU to be flawed in the sense that it promotes bad pleasure over wellbeing, it might be repaired if we instead focus on promoting the utility of wellbeing instead of pleasure. From certain objective perspectives this could potentially solve much of the world’s problems by leading us to sacrifice pleasure for the overall well being of humanity, as opposed to sacrificing wellbeing for pleasure. This would result in classical utilitarian’s encouraging society to forgo passing pleasures and hobbies in favor of improving conditions for those less fortunate, such as citizens of third world countries. This would increase utility without risk of causing injustice, but presents a different objection to CAU, that it is too demanding and therefore unworkable[8], and in this example is asking more than Western society feels it is required to do. Therefore it becomes apparent that while CAU can be adjusted to maximize utility in a way that benefits humanity without causing injustices, it cannot be viewed as a viable option even in this instance as it requires people to give more than they are inclined to offer.

            Classical act utilitarianism is a useful approach to how society should make decisions as a collective entity. However the injustice objection makes it apparent that if this concept is applied hedonistically it can result in injustices that do not benefit society, and can instead be employed to promote personal pleasure over others pain. It is under this objection that it becomes clear that classical act utilitarianism could be of benefit to society only if it was used with the intention of utilizing wellbeing, whether personal or for humanity as a whole. However, while this is a useful concept for how we might improve our world and promote total wellbeing, it asks too much to be realistically applicable. In this sense it reveals that classical act utilitarianism is likely to be applied only for personal gain, and is therefore unlikely to ever be a useful component of society.

Works Cited

Benn, Piers. Ethics: Fundamentals of Philosophy. New York: University of Leeds, 2009.

Rachels, James. The Elements of Moral Philosophy, Fourth Edition. New York: Ken King, 2003.

Appendix

Figure 1

[1] Piers Benn, Ethics: Fundamentals of Philosophy (New York: University of Leeds, 2009), 61

[2] James Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy (New York: Ken King, 2003), 114.

[3] Ibid., 114-5.

[4] Ibid., 115.

[5] Piers, Ethics, 65

[6] James, Elements of Ethics, 106

[7] Piers, Ethics,  65

[8] James, Elements of Eithcs, 109