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Research Reports may be required in final year or graduate level courses and are usually carried out independently, with the aim to generate new knowledge. A research question is developed, justified and embedded in the existing literature on the topic, and the writer demonstrates strong understanding of research methods and an ability to discuss results and their implications.  Research Reports can use topic-specific sections or the standard IMRD (Introduction, Methods, Results, Discussion) sections. They can be presented as dissertations, long essays or research articles (Nesi & Gardner, 2012, p. 136-138).

About this paper

Title: Policy report: discouraging fleeing from the police

Proposal: 

Proposals focus on the planning stage of problem solving. They define a problem, generate possible solutions, and identify and justify recommended solution(s). They include Problem-solution texts, Policy reports, Marketing proposals, and Research proposals.

Research report: 

Research reports require independent work; they aim to generate new knowledge. A research question is developed and embedded in existing literature. The writer demonstrates strong understanding of research methods, and the ability to discuss results and implications. Presented as dissertations, long essays or research articles.

Copyright: Laura Jones

Level: 

Third year

Description: How can we discourage drivers from fleeing the Police in New Zealand?

Warning: This paper cannot be copied and used in your own assignment; this is plagiarism. Copied sections will be identified by Turnitin and penalties will apply. Please refer to the University's Academic Integrity resource and policies on Academic Integrity and Copyright.

Policy report: discouraging fleeing from the police

Executive Summary

This report studies the problem of drivers fleeing from the police, and makes recommendations on how to discourage drivers from this behaviour in New Zealand. In 2010, 16 New Zealanders died as a result of drivers fleeing the police, and many of those deaths were of passengers and innocent bystanders.[1] Fleeing drivers pose a considerable risk to the public and there can be much gain from managing this risk through discouragement methods. The comparative institutional analysis method is used in this report to compare different facets of the fleeing driver profile with their most effective management methods.  Unlicensed drivers and intoxicated drivers were found to be the most valuable groups for gaining new insights, as they match the fleeing driver profile most closely, and indeed are often the same drivers who choose to flee. Management of these drivers is seen to be most effective through the usage of license and vehicular sanctions, in conjunction with extralegal/social sanctions, and with a greater certainty of punishment for offenders.

 

 

Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. 1

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS. 3

INTRODUCTION.. 4

BACKGROUND.. 5

- Police Pursuit Policy

-Legislation and Penalties

-Public Attitudes, Media and Ideologies

-Offenders

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK. 11

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS. 12

Step 1: Refining analytical questions

Step 2: Research design and cases

Step 3: Analysis of relevant information

Step 4: Relationships between institutional choice and observed outcomes

Step 5: Findings

DISCUSSION.. 19

CONCLUSION.. 22

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 23

 

 

Policy Recommendations

Recommendation 3: Police and Government should be encouraged to refer to ‘fleeing driver pursuits’ or ‘criminal pursuits’ instead of police pursuits.

Recommendation 4: Fleeing police as a charge should not be dropped at sentencing if avoidable, and penalties for the charge should be additional to, not concurrent with, any other penalties for additional convictions.

Recommendation 2: If a fleeing driver is unlicensed, the vehicle involved in the offence should be subject to mandatory impoundment at the time of arrest for 30 days on first offence, 60 days on second offence, and forfeit on third or subsequent offences, with the offender liable for costs.

Recommendation 1: License sanctions should be a first-offence penalty for fleeing drivers under section 114 of the Land Transport Act.

 

 

Introduction

Police pursuits are initiated for one reason: because drivers fail to stop at the request of a police officer.[2] In New Zealand, despite numerous reviews of pursuit policy and a change in legislation, Police now engage in 2000-2500 pursuits per year, a 389% increase since statistics became readily available in 1996.[3] Around one in four pursuits end in a crash, and in 2010, 16 New Zealanders were killed as a result of police pursuits.   [4] The overwhelming focus of international research and policy review has focused on police responsibilities surrounding pursuits.[5] Research on offenders who flee police is negligible. This report attempts to begin addressing this gap in by focusing primarily on offender management strategies to discourage this behaviour. To begin, a contextual review of police pursuit policy, current legislation, public attitudes, and offender profiles is given as background. From there, the ‘comparative institutional’ analytical method is used to compare methods of discouraging those offenders that match/make up the profile of fleeing drivers (drunk drivers, unlicensed drivers, and auto thieves). Some key conclusions arise from this: firstly, that license and vehicle sanctions are the most effective way to deal with those offenders, and will likely be effective at discouraging fleeing drivers also. Secondly, deterrence policies are most effective when “soft” and “hard” methods of enforcement are used in conjunction. And lastly, the ‘certainty of punishment’ for the charge of ‘failure to stop’ needs to be addressed for any new policies to be effective.

Background

Police Pursuit Policy

New Zealand’s Land Transport Act gives police the power to require drivers to stop.[6]  New Zealand pursuit policy is a ‘restrictive’ policy, which means that certain restrictions are placed on officers before and during pursuits, including risk assessments.[7] Although official police pursuit policy is an internal document, it is known that police abandon pursuits either when a) the offender’s identity becomes known or b) the pursuit becomes too dangerous to continue.[8] The fact that these thresholds are known by many offenders can turn pursuits into a dangerous game of ‘cat and mouse’ where offenders intentionally drive dangerously to force police to abandon the pursuit.[9] Police pursuits have been reviewed internally four times in six years, as well as by the Independent Police Conduct Authority (IPCA), and each time recommendations are that the policy largely remains the same.[10]  It is clear, then, that further research into police responsibilities is unlikely to shed much more light on the offender aspect of this issue.

Legislation and Sentencing

New Zealand recently (effective December 2009) enacted a legislation change to the Land Transport (Enforcement Powers) Act.[11] This was known as the “boy-racer” bill, enacted to deal with drag racing and similar anti-social vehicular behaviours. However, it also contained new penalty changes for the offence of ‘failure to stop’, allowing imprisonment upon a third or subsequent offence.[12] As it stands now, the penalties in New Zealand for failing to stop for the police are as follows, as outlined in section 114 of the Land Transport Act:[13]

-The maximum penalty on conviction for a first offence is a fine not exceeding $10,000.

-For a second offence, and if while failing to comply with police orders to stop, the person exceeded the applicable speed limit or operated a motor vehicle in an otherwise dangerous manner, a court must order the person to be disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver licence for 3 months.

-  For a third or subsequent offence:

  • (a)the maximum penalty is imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 months; and
  • (b)the court must order the person to be disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver licence for 1 year.

In addition, the confiscation of vehicles is permitted (but not mandatory) in relation to violating section 114.[14] The legislation in New Zealand for ‘failure to stop’ thus represents a ‘three strikes’ type of system where only on a third (or subsequent) offence is imprisonment an option, and only on two offences is license disqualification an option - though license sanctions are permitted (but not mandatory) on any offence if the offender is also convicted of dangerous or reckless driving.[15]

Nevertheless, data from the Police Prosecution Service shows that between 2006 and 2008, over 70% of the charges of ‘failure to stop’ that went through the courts had no sentence imposed. Of those that did, the penalty was usually a fine, of an average $325.[16] Internationally, also, failure to stop is often considered a ‘starter’ charge, to be dropped if the offender pleads guilty to more serious offences.[17]

In Australia, in the states of New South Wales and Victoria, there exist much harsher penalties for the specific charge of failure to stop. Both states allow imprisonment on the first offence; in Victoria mandatory license disqualification is also in effect from the first offence. [18] These are both relatively recent law changes, as is New Zealand’s law change, so it is not yet possible to compare the relative effects of harsher or weaker penalties on fleeing drivers.[19]

Public attitudes, media, and ideologies

With an issue as controversial as this, it is important to take stock of attitudes and ideologies, since policy changes without public support are unlikely to be worth pursuing. Police and government have been under particular pressure since the 16 pursuit deaths in 2010.[20] In similar circumstances, New South Wales was in part able to pass its harsher law due to public pressure after the death of Skye Sassine, an 18-month old toddler who was killed after a fleeing driver ploughed into her family car. The bill was named for her.[21]

There is no New Zealand research on public attitudes to police pursuits. However, a New Zealand Herald opinion debate found a strong majority of readers in favour of placing the blame on fleeing drivers rather than police.[22] Nonetheless, pursuits are a fine line to walk in terms of public opinion; there is always a segment of the public (and government; the Green Party in particular) that argue that police pursuits are not worth the risk.[23] Still, policy changes for this issue are still likely to find political support; the leaders of National and Labour have both proposed harsher penalties for fleeing drivers.[24] Police are certainly in favour of change, with many reporting frustration that the charge of failure to stop is treated so leniently on its own, as well as anger that media coverage of pursuits tends to focus on police actions rather than offenders.[25]  “We shouldn’t be calling them police pursuits...we need to put the negative connotation back on the...fleeing driver.”[26]

Overall, the base of public opinion does seem to favour pursuing fleeing offenders. However, it is crucial to note the results of a study by MacDonald and Alpert, who found that the more informed the public were about the risks of police pursuits, the less they supported apprehending offenders (unless for violent crimes).[27] In addition, publicising this particular issue may run the risk of having the opposite effect to discouraging fleeing: it may instead highlight fleeing as an option.[28] This has important implications for the use of social marketing campaigns for this issue; care should be taken in using them too heavily.

Offenders

Ultimately, while research on police pursuits, legislation and attitudes are all important for grounding this policy problem, discouraging offenders from fleeing requires the main research focus to be on the offenders themselves.

As stated, research into the offender’s side of police pursuits is not extensive. Nonetheless, a summary of what is known so far is needed to move forward. The profile of the ‘typical offender’ is as follows:

- Fleeing drivers are overwhelmingly male. A figure of over 90% is consistent both in New Zealand and internationally.[29]

- Fleeing drivers are usually young. International data gives figures of 75% under the age of 30,  with an average of 26.2 years.  [30] The IPCA’s investigation into 137 New Zealand pursuits that resulted in death or serious injury found that 80% of offenders were aged under 30, 40% aged under 20.[31]

- The majority of fleeing drivers are unlicensed. This can mean never licensed, disqualified/suspended, or in breach of license conditions (i.e. on learner or restricted licenses). Out of the 137 pursuits analysed by the IPCA, only 28 offenders were licensed to drive the vehicle involved.[32] This is consistent with international data.[33]

-The drivers are often offending at the time, either by being

  • under the influence of drugs or alcohol, or
  • in a stolen car (or both).

In the IPCA’s report, 38% of vehicles involved in pursuits were stolen.[34]  Approximately ¼ to â…“ of fleeing drivers have consumed alcohol, and this is likely to be a conservative estimate given that we only see figures for offenders who are apprehended.[35] Dunham et al put the figure at 42%.[36]

Lastly, reasons for being pursued and reasons for fleeing are a crucial but very under researched area of data on offenders. Interestingly, international data shows that the main reason for pursuits being initiated is traffic and driving violations, often minor.[37] In the IPCA’s report, 65% of pursuits were initiated for this reason, and only 23% of pursuits were initiated due to known or suspected criminal offending.[38] In the Dunham et al study, 32% of offenders said that they fled due to being in a stolen car, but offenders could choose multiple reasons and thus the percentages do not add up to 100. The next most common reasons for fleeing were suspended driver’s licenses (27%), running from crime scenes/arrest warrants (27%), and being under the influence of drugs/alcohol (21%).[39]

 

Conceptual Framework

The heavy focus on police responsibilities in pursuits has not yielded new insights into offender deterrence in recent years. This report has therefore decided to focus on ascertaining ways to discourage the ‘typical offender,’ as outlined above. It is not possible to effectively find one policy that will discourage all fleeing drivers, but since the ‘typical offender’ profile is robust enough, offender discouragement methods can build from there. The ‘comparative institutional analysis’ method will be most useful for generating fresh insights, since it allows comparisons to be made across institutions in terms of how effective different methods are for dealing with the same policy problems. The comparative data on fleeing drivers across institutions is not robust enough to perform this type of analysis; therefore a different approach is needed.  The makeup of the ‘offender profile’ will be used as the base of comparison. The underlying assumption of this analysis is that if there are effective institutional methods for dealing with those drivers that make up the fleeing offender profile, (e.g. drunk drivers and unlicensed drivers), then those methods could be applied in New Zealand institutions to deal with fleeing drivers.

 

Analysis and findings

Step 1: Refining analytical questions:

The policy problem we face here is how to discourage drivers from fleeing the police in New Zealand. The current institutional settings regarding New Zealand legislation and sentencing of the ‘failure to stop’ charge are outlined above. As it stands now, the current institutional arrangements in New Zealand regarding police pursuits are largely in line with other jurisdictions, but significant differences in terms of penalties and sanctions do exist, and the low certainty and severity of punishment has been seen by the Police Association as exacerbating the issue.[40]

Step 2: Research Design and Cases

The comparative institutional analysis method will be used to compare effective deterrence methods between those types of offenders that make up the fleeing driver profile. These elements of the fleeing driver profile will be separated for the purpose of comparison, to act as ‘cases.’ The cases are: intoxicated drivers, unlicensed drivers, and auto thieves. Young male drivers are not selected as a case here, since they are not a homogenous group in terms of offending- not all young males flee police, though most who flee police are young males. It is important to remember that separating these cases is for comparative purposes only; fleeing drivers often belong to more than one of these groups.

Step 3: Analysis of Relevant Information.

To clarify what aspects of institutions will be focused on in this research, these three specific questions will be asked across the cases:

  1. Do the offenders in this group match the fleeing driver profile?
  2. What are the most effective institutional methods of discouraging these drivers from offending?
  3. How has this been shown?

Step 5 will elaborate on the results of these questions. A table will be presented with the results of questions 1 and 2, and will further ask:

Are these methods likely to be effective on fleeing drivers?

Step 4: Relationships between institutional choice and observed outcomes.

To ensure that the relationship between institutional choice and observed outcomes can be isolated, care is taken to ensure that, where possible, data for offender deterrence methods are compared within cases. For example, offenders who received a certain penalty (with an associated outcome) are compared with offenders who committed the same offence, but received a different penalty (and associated outcome). Within-case comparison of institutional methods can isolate the relationship between one method of offender discouragement and its observed outcome.

 

Step 5: Findings

 

 

Case

Do the offenders in this case match the profile of fleeing drivers?

What are the most effective methods for discouraging these drivers?

Are these methods likely to be effective on fleeing drivers?

 

 

Intoxicated Drivers

Yes

License and vehicle sanctions

 

 

Yes

 

Unlicensed Drivers

Yes

Vehicle sanctions

 

 

Yes

 

Auto Thieves

Partially

Prevention Strategies

 

No

 

Intoxicated Drivers:

  1. Do the offenders in this case match the profile of fleeing drivers?

Yes.  The offenders are overwhelmingly male and young.[41] They are under the influence of drugs or alcohol while driving (as fleeing drivers often are), and display numerous psychological and behavioural characteristics that distinguish them as higher risk takers and thrill seekers than regular drivers.[42]

  1. What are the most effective institutional methods of discouraging these drivers from offending?

License and vehicular sanctions have been found to be more effective on drink driving offenders than other penalties like fines or community service.[43] Mass media campaigns in conjunction with legal sanctions have also been effective.[44]

  1. How has this been shown?

Drunk driving offenders who receive license and vehicle sanctions end up having better safety records, and drive less, than those who receive other penalties. Those better records also continue past the time period of legal sanction.[45] It is impossible to tell whether the offenders are driving less or just more cautiously, but either way, they are discouraged from reoffending.[46]

Jurisdictions often produce license and vehicle sanctions as part of a two-step sanction program- DUI first offenders receive suspensions, and DWS offenders or repeat offenders receive vehicle sanctions (impoundments and forfeiture).

Comparative jurisdictions:

  • The Canadian province of Manitoba reported a 12% reduction in alcohol related vehicular fatalities, and a 26% fewer single-vehicle night crashes after introducing license and vehicle sanctions for DUI and DWS offenders.[47]
  • Ohio reported reduced recidivism with these methods.[48]
  • In California, first offenders who received vehicle sanctions had 18.1% fewer traffic convictions and 24.7% fewer crashes than offenders who did not.[49]

Mass media campaigns (extralegal/social sanctions) against drunk driving worked to create a climate of opinion against drunk driving, which had a normative effect on behaviour.[50] The campaigns contributed to a reduction in alcohol related vehicular incidents.[51] Risks perceived by drink drivers were increased by public awareness.[52]

 

Unlicensed Drivers

  1. Do the offenders in this group match the fleeing driver profile?

Yes. They tend to mirror the profile of drunk drivers closely, though the age profile tends to be younger due to allowing for offenders who have never held licenses (as well as suspended offenders).[53]

  1. What are the most effective institutional methods of discouraging these drivers from offending?

Vehicle sanctions (impoundments and forfeitures) have proved most effective, especially if put in place at the time of arrest.[54]

  1. How has this been shown?

Due to the impossibility of separating out the effectiveness of measures put in place for both DUI and DWS offenders, the data above for drunk driver sanction programs also applies to DWS offenders.

Additional data includes:

-Vehicle sanctions on first offences, as well as harsher sanctions on repeat offences, was shown to reduce DWS offences by 27% within four years of implementation in Manitoba, Canada. [55] Vehicle sanctions thus certainly discourage repeated DWS offending.

-Repeat DWS offenders in California who received vehicle sanctions had 34.2% fewer DWS convictions, and 37.6% fewer crashes than repeat offenders who received other penalties.[56]

 

Auto Thieves

  1. Do the offenders in this group match the fleeing driver profile?

Partially. Auto thieves are usually young, male, and regularly use drugs or alcohol prior to stealing cars. However, the profile of auto thieves contains an element of rational criminality based on the payoff of auto theft that is not as present in the cases of intoxicated and unlicensed drivers.[57]

  1. What are the most effective institutional methods of discouraging these drivers from offending?

Prevention strategies are most commonly used to discourage auto thieves, namely technological/security innovations to make the theft of cars more difficult.[58]

  1. How has this been shown?

Most research focuses on discouraging auto theft through prevention rather than deterrence, since discouraging offenders is perceived to be a difficult problem due to the psychological pay-off and status that successful auto thieves find through auto theft.[59] Thus, the most effective methods for discouraging auto thieves are not applicable to fleeing drivers.

In Light’s study of auto thieves, 89% of offenders stated that the risk of apprehension made no difference to their offending, and 91% of interviewees reported having been chased by police (71% more than once).[60] Auto thieves represent an element of the fleeing driver profile that would be the most difficult to discourage from reoffending with policy changes. License and vehicle sanctions have little to no effect on auto thieves since, by definition, the car they are driving if caught is not licensed to or owned by the offender. Only a quarter of offenders reported being deterred by custody.[61]

 

Discussion

It should be pointed out that so far, the most effective institutional method available to discourage drivers from fleeing is a pursuit policy. Most drivers in New Zealand do not flee, and the current pursuit policy certainly discourages many of those who might.[62] However, certain methods for discouraging those who do flee have arisen from the above analysis. Overall, the findings show that intoxicated drivers and unlicensed drivers are the best groups to look at for comparing effective institutional methods of deterrence. Auto thieves as a group were less helpful to look at, since prevention strategies had less effect on repeat offending than discouragement methods did for unlicensed and intoxicated drivers.

Ultimately, license and vehicle sanctions were seen to be the most effective methods for dealing with intoxicated and unlicensed drivers. License sanctions are often seen as ineffective due to the fact that the majority of offenders who receive these penalties admit violating them and driving anyway.[63] However, the bottom line of the data suggests that this still reduces the amount of time spent on the road, the amount of driving offences, and the amount of dangerous driving.[64] Jurisdictions that implemented license sanctions on a first offence have improved safety records and it follows logically that these sanctions are effective at discouraging offenders from reoffending.[65] By discouraging drivers in this way, fewer drivers will drive, drive dangerously, and drive often, and thus fewer drivers will find themselves in situations where they come to the attention of police and feel the need to flee.

Recommendation 1: License sanctions should be a first-offence penalty for fleeing drivers under section 114 of the Land Transport Act.

 

Unlicensed driving is a particular problem, in that it makes penalties like the one recommended above less effective, and demonstrates that these offenders are less discouraged by formal sanctions.[66] However, vehicular sanctions have been shown to be effective against these offenders, in part because studies show offenders are more likely to drive unlicensed if they have ready access to a vehicle.[67] The most effective vehicle sanction programs are implemented at the time of arrest, rather than waiting until conviction, and are graded from impoundment (for first offenders) to forfeiture (for repeat offenders). [68] Having effective ways to discourage unlicensed drivers from driving is crucial, since they form the majority of the fleeing drivers’ profile. A vehicle sanction program also does not necessarily need to be costly to implement, as most programs make the offender liable for costs.

Recommendation 2: If a fleeing driver is unlicensed, the vehicle involved in the offence should be subject to mandatory impoundment at the time of arrest for 30 days on first offence, 60 days on second offence, and forfeit on third or subsequent offences, with the offender liable for costs.

 

Media and public attitudes have also been found to be effective at creating ‘social norms’ in the case of drink-driving, and data shows that deterrence programs are most effective when combined with some form of extralegal/social reinforcement as well.[69]. Large public awareness campaigns on this issue could potentially risk publicising fleeing the police as an option, which would have the opposite effect from discouragement. Using campaigns similar to the ‘shock-horror’ campaigns against drunk driving could also backfire, since highlighting the risks involved tends to result in a decreased public support for pursuit policies.[70] Given the negative connotations of the term ‘police pursuits’ (which give the impression that blame lies with police), something as small as a publicised wording change to ‘criminal pursuits’ or fleeing driver pursuits’ could indicate to potential offenders that fleeing the police is a serious offence, and develop societal discouragement of this behaviour.

Recommendation 3: Police and Government should be encouraged to refer to ‘fleeing driver pursuits’ or ‘criminal pursuits’ instead of police pursuits.

 

Lastly, the above recommendations will be ineffective even if implemented against fleeing drivers if sentencing continues as it does now. Tavares et al. found that when implementing legal sanctions, “governments should focus on the certainty of punishment first.”[71] Drivers will not be discouraged from fleeing if the penalty they receive for fleeing is the same/less than what they would have received if they had not fled, i.e. penalties for drink driving or license violations, with penalties for fleeing police dropped. This does not reflect the added risk to the public that fleeing drivers pose. Certainty of sentencing, and preferably certainty that the penalty that offenders receive will be heavier than if the offender had not fled, are crucial elements in discouraging drivers from fleeing.

Recommendation 4: Fleeing police as a charge should not be dropped at sentencing if avoidable, and penalties for the charge should be additional to, not concurrent with, any other penalties for additional convictions.

 

Conclusion

This report attempted to address the policy problem of fleeing drivers, who are responsive for many road deaths in New Zealand. Research into police responsibilities surrounding pursuits is extensive, yet research into offenders is not. This report focused on the offenders who flee police, and attempted to research what would be effective ways to discourage fleeing the police. License and vehicular sanctions in conjunction with public awareness were shown to be the most effective methods for discouraging drunk drivers and unlicensed drivers, which were the groups most closely aligned with the fleeing driver profile. Certainty of punishment was also an important issue. Further research into auto thief offenders and how to discourage offending would be a useful addition to the knowledge base of this issue, as well as more research into fleeing offenders generally. Scholarly research into the New Zealand public’s attitudes to police pursuits would also be a useful method to ascertain how much support policy changes in this area are likely to muster.

 

 

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[1] Charlie Gates, Keith Lynch, and Jo Gilbert, "Elderly couple killed by driver fleeing police,"  http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/crime/4066068/Two-killed-in-Christchurch-after-police-pursuit.

[2] "Pursuit Policy Review," ed. Road Policing Support New Zealand Police (2010), i.

[3] Steve Plowman, "'Failing to Stop' Needs to Be Taken Seriously," Police News 43, no. 9 (2010).

[4] Ibid.

[5] J Hill, "High-Speed Police Pursuits: Dangers, Dynamics, and Risk Reduction," FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin July(2002): 14; R Dunham et al., "High-Speed Pursuit : The Offenders' Perspective," Criminal Justice and Behavior 25, no. 1 (1998): 31; G Hoffman and P Mazerolle, "Police pursuits in Queensland: research, review and reform," Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management 28, no. 3 (2005): 531; W.L. Hicks, "Police vehicular pursuits: a descriptive analysis of state agencies’ written policy," Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management 26, no. 1 (2006): 107.

[6] "Land Transport Act 1998 No 110 (as at 09 August 2011), Public Act," section 114.

[7] IPCA, "Review of Police Pursuits," ed. Independent Police Conduct Authority (Wellington2009), 17.

[8] "Pursuit Policy Review,"  32, 59.

[9] Ibid., 43; New Zealand Police Association, "Police Pursuits," Towards a Safer New Zealand: Police and Law & Order Policies for the Future June 2008, 14.

[10] IPCA, "Review of Police Pursuits."; "Pursuit Policy Review,"  i.

[11] "Land Transport Amendment Act 2005 No 77 (as at 01 October 2007), Public Act."

[12] IPCA, “Review of Police Pursuits,” 14.

[13] "Land Transport Act 1998 No 110 (as at 09 August 2011), Public Act."

[14] "Sentencing Act 2002 No 9 (as at 10 May 2011), Public Act," sections 128 & 29.

[15] "Land Transport Act 1998 No 110 (as at 09 August 2011), Public Act,"  section 35.

[16] "Pursuit Policy Review,"  43.

[17] Plowman, "'Failing to Stop' Needs to Be Taken Seriously."

[18] "New South Wales- Crimes Act 1900 No 40, section 51B."; "Victoria Road Safety Act 1986, section 64A."

[19] "Media Release from the Minister of Police and Emergency Services: Tough New Police Pursuit Laws," (July 17th 2007); Nick Ralston, "Girl, 15, first to be charged under police chase law," Sydney Morning Herald(March 25th 2010), http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/girl-15-first-to-be-charged-under-police-chase-law-20100325-qyxq.html.

[20] Derek Chang, "New Zealand Looking At Mandatory Jail For Those That Flee," New Zealand Herald(January 4th 2011), http://policedriving.com/?p=148.

[21] R Wooley, "Skye Sassine's law passed," Canterbury Bankstown Express(10th February 2010), http://express.whereilive.com.au/news/story/skye-sassine-s-law-passed/.

[22] "What should be done about high-speed police chases? (Your views)- selection of forum debates,"  New Zealand Herald(May 1 2007), http://www.nzherald.co.nz/opinion/news/article.cfm?c_id=466&objectid=10436959.

[23] Hoffman and Mazerolle, "Police pursuits in Queensland: research, review and reform," 531; "Tougher penalties possible for drivers fleeing police,"  Otago Daily Times(6th December 2010), http://www.odt.co.nz/news/national/139510/tougher-penalties-possible-drivers-fleeing-police.

[24] "Tougher penalties possible for drivers fleeing police"; Andrea Vance, "Impound fleeing drivers' cars - Goff,"(15th October 2010), http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/4237324/Impound-fleeing-drivers-cars-Goff.

[25] Anna Leask, "'Idiots' fuel fatal pursuits - top cop," New Zealand Herald(September 12th 2010), http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10672734.

[26] Ibid.

[27] J MacDonald and G Alpert, "Public Attitudes to Police Pursuit Driving," Journal of Criminal Justice 26, no. 3 (1998): 194.

[28] B Watson, "The Road Safety Implications of Unlicensed Driving: A Survey of Unlicensed Drivers," ed. Australian Transport Safety Bureau (Centre for Accident Research and Road Safety, Queensland University of Technology, 2003), 25.

[29] Hoffman and Mazerolle, "Police pursuits in Queensland: research, review and reform," 535; Dunham et al., "High-Speed Pursuit : The Offenders' Perspective," 36; IPCA, "Review of Police Pursuits," 24.

[30] Hoffman and Mazerolle, "Police pursuits in Queensland: research, review and reform," 535; Dunham et al., "High-Speed Pursuit : The Offenders' Perspective," 36.

[31] IPCA, "Review of Police Pursuits."

[32] Ibid.

[33] D Best and K Eves, "Why are there no lessons learned from road traffic incidents involving the police?," criminal Justice 5(2005): 38; Hoffman and Mazerolle, "Police pursuits in Queensland: research, review and reform," 535.

[34] IPCA, "Review of Police Pursuits," 22.

[35] Hoffman and Mazerolle, "Police pursuits in Queensland: research, review and reform," 535.

[36] Dunham et al., "High-Speed Pursuit : The Offenders' Perspective," 37.

[37] Hoffman and Mazerolle, "Police pursuits in Queensland: research, review and reform," 534.

[38] IPCA, "Review of Police Pursuits," 21.

[39] Dunham et al., "High-Speed Pursuit : The Offenders' Perspective," 37.

[40] Plowman, "'Failing to Stop' Needs to Be Taken Seriously."

[41] H Ross and P Gonzales, "Effects of License Revocation on Drunk Driving Offenders," Accident Analysis and Prevention 20, no. 5 (1988): 382.

[42] Watson, "The Road Safety Implications of Unlicensed Driving: A Survey of Unlicensed Drivers," 17.

[43] Ross and Gonzales, "Effects of License Revocation on Drunk Driving Offenders," 379; Watson, "The Road Safety Implications of Unlicensed Driving: A Survey of Unlicensed Drivers," 22; D DeYoung, "An evaluation of the specific deterrent effects of vehicle impoundment on suspended, revoked, and unlicensed drivers in California," Accident Analysis and Prevention 31(1999): 45; D DeYoung and R Voas, "Vehicle action: effective policy for controlling drunk and other high-risk drivers?," Accident Analysis and Prevention 34(2002): 263.

[44] R Elder et al., "Effectiveness of Mass Media Campaigns for Reducing Drinking and Driving and Alcohol-Involved Crashes," American Journal of Preventative Medicine 27, no. 1 (2004): 63; A Fletcher et al., "Countermeasures to driver fatigue: a review of public awareness campaigns and legal approaches," Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health 29, no. 5 (2005): 472; R Tay, "Exploring the Effects of a Road Safety Advertising Campaign on the Perceptions and Intentions of the Target and Nontarget Audiences to Drink and Drive," Traffic Injury Prevention 3, no. 3 (2002): 198; Watson, "The Road Safety Implications of Unlicensed Driving: A Survey of Unlicensed Drivers," 29.

[45] Ross and Gonzales, "Effects of License Revocation on Drunk Driving Offenders," 379.

[46] V Siskind, "Does License Disqualification Reduce Reoffence Rates?," Accident Analysis and Prevention 28, no. 4 (1996): 519.

[47] Watson, "The Road Safety Implications of Unlicensed Driving: A Survey of Unlicensed Drivers," 22.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Fletcher et al., "Countermeasures to driver fatigue: a review of public awareness campaigns and legal approaches," 472.

[51] Elder et al., "Effectiveness of Mass Media Campaigns for Reducing Drinking and Driving and Alcohol-Involved Crashes," 63.

[52] Tay, "Exploring the Effects of a Road Safety Advertising Campaign on the Perceptions and Intentions of the Target and Nontarget Audiences to Drink and Drive," 198.

[53] Watson, "The Road Safety Implications of Unlicensed Driving: A Survey of Unlicensed Drivers," 2, 22.

[54] DeYoung and Voas, "Vehicle action: effective policy for controlling drunk and other high-risk drivers?," 270.

[55] Watson, "The Road Safety Implications of Unlicensed Driving: A Survey of Unlicensed Drivers," 22.

[56] Ibid.

[57] H Copes and M Cherbonneau, "The Key to Auto-Theft: Emerging Methods of Auto Theft from the Offenders’ Perspective," British Journal of Criminology 46, no. 5 (2006): 917.

[58] M Dhami, "Youth Auto Theft: A Survey of a General Population of Canadian Youth," Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice 50, no. 2 (2008).

[59] R Light, C Nee, and H Ingham, "Car Theft: The Offender's Perspective," in Home Office Research Studies NO.130, ed. Home Office Research and Planning Unit (London1993), 71.

[60] Ibid., 58.

[61] Ibid., 69.

[62] R Crew, L Fridell, and K Purcell, "Probabilities and Odds in Hot Pursuit: a Benefit-Cost Analysis," Journal of Criminal Justice 23, no. 5 (1995): 423.

[63] Ross and Gonzales, "Effects of License Revocation on Drunk Driving Offenders," 387; DeYoung, "An evaluation of the specific deterrent effects of vehicle impoundment on suspended, revoked, and unlicensed drivers in California," 45.

[64] DeYoung and Voas, "Vehicle action: effective policy for controlling drunk and other high-risk drivers?," 263; Ross and Gonzales, "Effects of License Revocation on Drunk Driving Offenders," 387.

[65] Watson, "The Road Safety Implications of Unlicensed Driving: A Survey of Unlicensed Drivers," 22.

[66] Ibid., 15.

[67] Ibid., 7.

[68] DeYoung and Voas, "Vehicle action: effective policy for controlling drunk and other high-risk drivers?," 270.

[69] Watson, "The Road Safety Implications of Unlicensed Driving: A Survey of Unlicensed Drivers," 15; Elder et al., "Effectiveness of Mass Media Campaigns for Reducing Drinking and Driving and Alcohol-Involved Crashes," 57; Fletcher et al., "Countermeasures to driver fatigue: a review of public awareness campaigns and legal approaches," 472.

[70] Watson, "The Road Safety Implications of Unlicensed Driving: A Survey of Unlicensed Drivers," 25.

[71] A Tavares, S Mendes, and C Costa, "The Impact of Deterrence Policies on Reckless Driving: The Case of Portugal," European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 14(2008): 426.