AWA: Academic Writing at Auckland

Abstract

Recent unrest in North Africa and the Middle East has highlighted the importance of humanitarian intervention in international relations. Since the end of the Cold War, there have been three major trends in the evolution of the concept: First, humanitarian motives are increasingly used to justify intervention without a clear threat to international peace and security. Second, the responsibility to protect has advanced the concept of humanitarian intervention. Third, there has been substantial progress in the debate between sovereignty and emerging norms on human rights and armed intervention. The legal context of humanitarian intervention is made up of treaty and customary international law, and there remains a clear legal gap between interventions authorised by the Security Council and those which are not. The case for intervention in Syria is assessed against the criteria of necessity, legality, legitimacy and feasibility.

 

The concept of humanitarian intervention continues to inspire intense debate within both academic and policymaking circles. It represents a conflict between the principle of sovereignty and international norms valuing human rights, and raises fundamental questions about international law and how to protect those rights. Recent unrest in the Middle East and North Africa indicate the subject remains contested and relevant. The concept of humanitarian intervention encompasses a complex interplay between politics and international law. In this essay I will approach the issue by examining the most important trends in the subject of humanitarian intervention since the end of the Cold War with regards to both its political and legal contexts. I will then discuss recent unrest in Syria, and assess calls for intervention against the criteria of necessity, legality, legitimacy and feasibility.

For the sake of this essay, humanitarian intervention will be defined as, ‘an armed intervention in another state, without the agreement of that state, to address a humanitarian disaster, in particular caused by grave and large-scale violations of fundamental human rights’.[1]  Humanitarian intervention thus has three elements: First, it involves military intervention into a foreign state. Second, its principal goals are humanitarian, although participants may also hold coinciding strategic interests. Third, it occurs without the permission of the state in which violations are occurring.

The norm of humanitarian intervention has developed significantly since the end of the Cold War. States are increasingly facing pressure to intervene abroad in order to stop human rights abuses, leading to interventions in a number of, although not all, humanitarian crises. The Cold War polarised the United Nations Security Council, and severely limited its willingness to intervene militarily in humanitarian crises. During the Cold War years, interventions by India, Tanzania, and Vietnam (into Bangladesh, Cambodia and Uganda respectively) occurred without Security Council approval and were not justified by the aggressors on humanitarian grounds.[2] The United States and Soviet Union regulated security within their own spheres of influence, suppressing local conflicts and frequently overlooking human rights abuses in allied states.[3]

One of the most striking developments in the field of international relations since the end of the Cold War has been the emerging notion that humanitarian motives are sufficient to justify military intervention. In 1991 a series of no-fly-zones and safe-havens were established in Northern Iraq by US, British and French forces in order to protect Kurdish civilians.[4] Only France sought to justify its actions based solely on humanitarian concerns, arguing that gross human rights violations should trigger intervention without the need for a clear threat to international peace and security.[5] The remaining members, by contrast, focussed instead on the threat to regional security posed by the flow of refugees displaced by the conflict. Although Tesón argues that references to international peace and security were merely, ‘added for good measure,’ this jars with China’s comments that there were only some, ‘international aspects’ to the conflict, indicating that without at least a minimal threat to international peace and security China and India, abstaining, would likely have voted against the resolution. [6] Human rights abuses thus played a secondary role in their decision to intervene.[7]

The requirement for a clear threat to international peace as a justification for armed intervention disappeared in 1992 when the Security Council authorised a US-led intervention in to Somalia. The language of the authorising resolution clearly indicates its purpose was humanitarian. It sought to address the, ‘magnitude of the humanitarian tragedy’, and demanded action to address, ‘widespread violations of international humanitarian law’.[8] Despite the tenuous link of this localised conflict to international peace and security, the resolution passed unanimously. [9] NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999, a bombing campaign against Serbian military installations, is another intervention which was justified on humanitarian grounds.[10] Similarly, in justifying his country’s recent intervention into Libya, President Obama argued they had a moral imperative to prevent, “a massacre that would have reverberated across the region and stained the conscience of the world”.[11] Whereas the resolution authorising intervention in Northern Iraq was at pains to couch the issue in terms of international peace and security, resolutions since that time, including the Libyan resolution, have focused on addressing human rights violations. This indicates that the Security Council and regional groupings such as NATO are increasingly willing to consider gross violations of human rights a justification for intervention in its own right rather than requiring a threat to international peace and security.

A second key development in the field of international relations has been the emergence of a responsibility to protect. The 1990s witnessed ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, genocide in Rwanda and mass starvation in Somalia, exposing shortcomings in the international community’s responses to each. In 1999 Kofi Annan called on the international community to respect the, ‘developing norm in favour of intervention to protect civilians’.[12] Later, in 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) released a report titled, ‘Responsibility to Protect’ in response to calls for a consensus on how to respond to humanitarian crises.[13] It aimed to alter the discourse from focussing on a ‘right to intervene’, to a ‘responsibility to protect’, and argues that the principle of non-intervention and state sovereignty should be the starting point, ‘from which any departure has to be justified’.[14] It then set out six criteria for armed intervention: right authority, just cause, right intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable prospects.[15] The report was endorsed by the General Assembly at the 2005 World Summit and in 2006 by the Security Council. [16] At the World Summit, states agreed upon the use of military intervention as the last resort where states are, ‘manifestly failing to protect their populations’.[17] It is true that the events of 9/11 also had an impact on humanitarian intervention, diminishing both its importance and its legitimacy, through the prioritisation of the ‘war on terrorism’, and through the disputed claim that the 2003 invasion of Iraq was undertaken on humanitarian grounds. [18]However; 2009 saw the responsibility to protect re-affirmed once more by the General Assembly, and it has recently been invoked in interventions in Darfur, Libya, Ivory Coast and unsuccessfully following Cyclone Nargis in Burma. [19]

The tension between the principle of state sovereignty on the one hand, and emerging norms that pressure states to intervene militarily to stop human suffering on the other, underpins the debate over humanitarian intervention. The establishment of a responsibility to protect has important implications for the principle of sovereignty: First, it implies that where a state fails to uphold the basic rights of its citizens it, ‘forfeit[s] the protection afforded them by international law.’[20] The forfeited protection is from Art. 2(7) of the UN Charter, which prohibits intervention, ‘in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state’.[21] Second, a state is increasingly answerable to the international society of states for the treatment of its subjects.[22] Third, it supports the human security argument that the human needs of individuals can prevail over notions of state security.[23] Nonetheless; the notion of state sovereignty arguably remains the best way to ensure a stable and peaceful world order. Ayoob represents the views of many third world and Non-western states when he argues that humanitarian intervention represents a threat to the progress of international society in removing its European underpinnings.[24] Recognising this, in the same document that authorises foreign air forces to patrol Libya’s air space, the Security Council stresses, ‘its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, [and] territorial integrity [of Libya]’.[25] The ability of China and Russia to veto resolutions remains a substantial balance to calls for intervention. Both countries are reluctant to accept a principle of intervention, but their acquiescence in regards to Libya demonstrates the likelihood that humanitarian intervention will continue as an international practice, despite reservations.

In the previous section I examined the political context of humanitarian intervention. I now turn to the evolution of the concept in international law since the end of the Cold War. There are two sources of international law; customary international law and codified law.[26] In customary international law, derived from the practice of states, all states contribute to its development. [27] For a new rule to become customary international law, it must be supported by a majority of states.[28]

The most important source of current treaty law is the UN Charter, which is binding on all its members. However; the humanitarian intervention debate predates the Charter. Even in 1860 the issue was contentious, with one writer arguing that although, ‘the [positive] law…prohibits intervention…there may even be cases in which it becomes a positive duty to transgress [positive law]’.[29] The Charter prohibits interference in a member state’s internal affairs and there are only two exceptions to this rule: First, Chapter VII authorises the Security Council to, ‘take such action…as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security’.[30] Second, states have the right of self-defence. This ensures that aggressive force, including humanitarian intervention, can only be authorised by the Security Council.  The Charter supersedes the right of intervention, which some claim exists in customary international law, as unambiguous treaty law is considered superior to a conflicting rule of customary international law.[31] Treaty law with regards to humanitarian intervention has seen little change since the end of WWII, although there have been two notable additions:  First, the 1948 Genocide Convention, ratified by the majority of states, contained an obligation ‘to prevent and to punish’ genocide.[32] Second, in 2006 the UN Security Council reaffirmed the principles of the Responsibility to Protect, lending it greater legal weight.[33]

Security Council resolutions provide legality to armed intervention, and their backing is sought by most would-be interveners. The majority of humanitarian interventions since 1991 have been made with some sort of Security Council Authorisation. Others, particularly NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, had no authorisation to act, but neither were they censured by the Council for doing so, with Kosovo being labelled ‘illegal but legitimate’ in a later report.[34] Bellamy argues that unilateral intervention without prior authorisation can be, ‘considered legitimate only in extraordinary circumstances.’[35] It is clear that Council-authorised interventions have a firmer basis in international law than their un-authorised counterparts. However, the question of legality does not end there; even with authorisation it is common for interventions to surpass what was authorised by the Security Council. In the case of Northern Iraq, the enforcement of no-fly zones and safe-havens by Western troops went well beyond the mandate authorised by the Security Council.[36] Similarly in Libya, the NATO air campaign has drawn criticism for going beyond the original Security Council authorisation. Russia in particular has been critical of what they view as a, ‘disproportionate use of force’.[37] Likewise, a decision by Britain to insert ground-based military advisers appears to skirt the exclusion of, ‘a foreign occupation force of any form’.[38]  However, the key distinction remains that where Northern Iraq, Somalia and Libya remain legal under international law, the NATO intervention in Kosovo is still widely considered to be illegal.

I will now assess calls for intervention into Syria against the criteria of necessity, legality, legitimacy and feasibility. Necessity considers whether the alleged humanitarian crisis warrants armed intervention. Legality considers whether it is likely to fulfil the UN Charter’s criteria of being a threat to international peace and security. Legitimacy examines whether non-military options have been exhausted and intervention is supported by the local population. Feasibility makes a practical assessment about an intervention’s ability to achieve its objectives.

Syria is strategically located at the heart of the Middle East, and is an important player in an unstable region. Recent uprisings in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya have contributed to increasing unrest in Syria. In March, protests in Syria began in earnest after a group of youths were jailed for painting anti-government slogans on a wall in the southern town of Dara’a. Mass protests resulted in the sacking of the local governor and the release of all 15 prisoners. Still disgruntled, protests in Dara’a continued to grow and the government turned increasingly to the security forces to restore order.[39]

There should be clear evidence of large-scale loss of life or violations of human rights to render intervention necessary. President Bashir Al-Assad has responded to the mounting unrest with some placatory concessions accompanied by a harsh, often lethal, crackdown. Four days after conceding to protestors’ demands to lift a 49 year old Emergency Law, Assad ordered the storming of Dara’a with security forces backed up by tanks and snipers, and similar operations have begun in other parts of the country.[40] One Syrian NGO has reported that more than 600 have died in the crackdown with nearly 8,000 arrested or missing, although there is no way of calculating the death toll accurately.[41] Placed in the context of other interventions, the death toll in Syria is considerably lower than many. Nor does the killing appear to be based on ethnic or religious lines. An important justification contained within the resolution authorising intervention in Libya was that the, ‘widespread and systematic attacks…against the civilian population may amount to crimes against humanity’.[42] No such allegation has been laid by foreign governments against Assad’s regime, suggesting the attacks are not of a similar scale and don’t warrant a similar response. Thus, although there are almost certainly violations of human rights occurring, the humanitarian crisis is not yet sufficiently large to necessitate armed intervention.

Humanitarian intervention needs to be authorised by the UN Security Council to be legal under international law. However, it has become increasingly clear that reaching a consensus towards the Syrian situation remains unlikely. Russia argues that the situation, ‘does not represent a threat to international peace and security’, and has ruled out intervention.[43] Disagreement within the Security Council has stymied a US attempt to issue a press statement calling on the government in Syria to stop violence against its citizens.[44] The likelihood of gaining Security Council authorisation for humanitarian intervention into Syria, and thus providing it with a legal basis, is low, and the US has taken a cautious approach. Thus, without the violence worsening considerably or a reversal of the positions held by many Security Council members, intervention is unlikely to receive Council backing.

An intervention will only be legitimate when other non-lethal options have been tried, shown to fail, and where a significant portion of the local population supports it. The case for intervention in Libya consisted of requests for assistance from rebel leadership, opposition leaders, the public and a regional body of which Libya was a member. [45] Similar calls have not materialised in the case of Syria. The US and some EU member states have implemented modest sanctions against a small number of high-ranking Syrian officials.[46] Criticisms by the US have been scathing, but do not call for the resignation of Assad.[47] Thus, although sanctions and verbal condemnation are a beginning, much more needs to be done by the international community before it considers its final option of armed intervention.  

An intervention may be necessary, legal and legitimate however, if it is unlikely to achieve its objective, it risks escalating the conflict further. Intervention in Kosovo and Libya has shown that NATO possesses the resources to conduct an intensive bombing campaign in the region. It is less clear whether they can sustain multiple interventions simultaneously. Without the ability to commit sufficient resources, the success of an intervention into Syria would be in doubt. In particular, the US, who would likely provide much of the force, is already stretched due to its efforts in Afghanistan, Libya and Iraq.[48] Many of Syria’s most senior officers are members of Assad’s Alawite clan, making defections unlikely, and with a population of over 22 million, Syria would prove a difficult target. [49]

In conclusion, one could reasonably suggest that the concept for humanitarian intervention had not progressed since the end of the Cold War. After all, the intervention in Libya shares many similarities to that in Northern Iraq: Russia and China remain cautious bystanders at best, and calls for interveners to scale back their responses remain. However, it is clear that since the end of the Cold War, there have been significant changes in the field of humanitarian intervention.  By studying the debates and motives for intervention from several examples, we see that humanitarianism is now considered a justification in its own right for intervention, where previously a clear threat to international peace and security was required. The responsibility to protect, although relatively recent, has already exerted a powerful influence on the way states perceive intervention, and advances have been made in the sovereignty versus intervention debate. The phenomenon of humanitarian intervention will become increasingly important, making it imperative that states continue to work to find a mutually acceptable position.

Bibliography

Abiew, Francis Kofi. Evolution of the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999.

Annan, Kofi. ‘Two concepts of sovereignty.’ The Economist, September 18, 1999. http://www.un.org/News/ossg/sg/stories/kaecon.html (accessed May 5, 2011).       

Ayoob, Mohammed. ‘Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty.’ International Journal of Human Rights 6, no. 1 (2002): 81-102. http://search.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.auckland.ac.nz/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=5446086&site=ehost-live (accessed May 6, 2011).

Bellamy, Alex J. Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq. Ethics and International Affairs 19, no. 2 (2005): 37-40. http://search.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.auckland.ac.nz/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=17791096&site=ehost-live (accessed May 2, 2011).

Bellamy, Alex J. And Paul D. Williams. ‘Who’s Keeping the Peace? Regionalization and Contemporary Peace Operations.’ International Security 29, no.4 (2005):157-195. http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.auckland.ac.nz/stable/4137500 (accessed May 15, 2011).

Borger, Julian, Ian Traynor, and Ewen MacAskill. ‘Gaddafi family deaths reinforce doubts about Nato’s UN mandate.’ Guardian, May 1, 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/01/gaddadi-family-deaths-reinforce-doubts (accessed May 5, 2011).

Byers, Michael, and Simon Chesterman. ‘Changing the rules about rules? Unilateral humanitarian intervention and the future of international law.’ In Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas, edited by J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, 177-201. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Central Intelligence Agency. ‘World Factbook: Syria.’ https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html (accessed May 5, 2011).

Evans, Gareth. ‘When is it right to fight?’ Survival 46, no. 3 (2004): 59-82. http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.auckland.ac.nz/10.1080/00396330412331343733 (accessed May 13, 2011).

Feller, Ben. ‘Obama Libya Speech Strongly Defends Intervention (Full Text).’ Huffington Post, March 28, 2011. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/28/obama-libya-speech-_n_841311.html#text (accessed May 10, 2011).

Hehir, Aidan. Humanitarian intervention: an introduction. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

ICISS. The Responsibility to Protect. December 2001. Available at http://www.iciss.ca/report-en.asp (accessed April 26, 2011).

Ignatieff , Michael. ‘State failure and nation building.’ In Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas, edited by J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, 299-321. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect. ‘The Crisis in Cote d’Ivoire.’ http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-ivory-coast (accessed May 10, 2011).

MacFarquhar, Neil. ‘Push in U.N. for Criticism of Syria is Rejected.’ New York Times, April 27, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/28/world/middleeast/28nations.html (accessed May 5, 2011).

Mydans, Seth. ‘Myanmar Faces Pressure to Allow Major Aid Effort.’ New York Times, May 8, 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/08/world/asia/08myanmar (accessed May 10, 2011).

New York Times. ‘Syria – Protests (2011),’ updated May 12, 2011. http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/syria/index.html?scp=1-spot&sq=syria&st=cse (accessed May 12, 2011).

Oweis, Khaled Yacoub. ‘Assad holds Syria army despite Sunni-Alawite divide.’ Reuters, April 6, 2011. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/06/us-syria-army-idUSTRE73543X20110406 (accessed May 5, 2011).

Peterson, Hayley. ‘Obama: ‘Stretched’ U.S. must relinquish lead in Libya.’ Washington Examiner, March 21, 2011. http://washingtonexaminer.com/politics/white-house/2011/03/obama-stretched-us-must-relinquish-lead-libya (accessed May 5, 2011).

Shahid, Anthony. ‘Syria Arrests Scores in House-to-House Roundup.’ New York Times, May 5, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/06/world/middleeast/06syria.html (accessed April 28, 2011).  

Tesón, Fernando R. ‘Eight Principles for Humanitarian Intervention.’ Journal of Military Ethics 5, no. 2 (2006): 93-113. http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.auckland.ac.nz/10.1080/15027570600707698 (accessed May 10, 2011).

Tesón, Fernando R. Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality. Transnational Publishers, 1997.

The Associated Press. ‘Libyan envoy urges international intervention.’ The Washington Post, February 25, 2011. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/25/AR2011022504349.html (accessed May 5, 2011).

The Associated Press. ‘US welcomes EU decision on Syria sanctions.’ CBS News, May 7, 2011. http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/05/07/ap/politics/main20060746.shtml (accessed May 7, 2011).

The White House. ‘Statement by the President on Syria.’ April 22, 2011. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/04/22/statement-president-syria (accessed May 5, 2011).

United Nations General Assembly. ‘2005 World Summit Outcome.’ http://www.un.org/summit2005/index.html, (accessed May 5, 2011).

United Nations General Assembly. ‘Implementing the responsibility to protect: report of the Secretary-General.’ http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/category,REFERENCE,UNGA,,,4989924d2,0.html (accessed May 4, 2011).

United Nations Security Council. ‘Resolution 1674 (2006).’ http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/7502864.59922791.html (accessed May 1, 2011).

United Nations Security Council. ‘Resolution 1706 (2006).’  http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/283139.441162348.html, (accessed May 10, 2011).

United Nations Security Council. ‘Resolution 1973 (2011).’ http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/1787758.4695816.html (accessed May5, 2011).

United Nations Security Council. ‘Resolution 688.’ http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/4658393.26381683.html (accessed April 29, 2011).

United Nations Security Council. ‘Resolution 794.’ http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/2924885.45179367.html (accessed May 2, 2011).

United Nations. ‘Charter of the United Nations.’ http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/ (accessed April 28, 2011). 

Victoria University Centre for Strategic Studies. ‘Humanitarian Intervention: Definitions and Criteria.’ http://www.victoria.ac.nz/css/docs/Strategic_Briefing_Papers/Vol.3%20Jun%202000/HI.pdf (accessed May 1, 2011).

Weiss, Thomas G. ‘The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a Unipolar Era.’ Security Dialogue 35, no. 2 (2004): 135-153. http://sdi.sagepub.com/content/35/2/135 (accessed May 4, 2011).

Welsh, Jennifer M, ed. Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Wheeler, Nicholas. Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

 

[1] Victoria University Centre for Strategic Studies, ‘Humanitarian Intervention: Definitions and Criteria,’ http://www.victoria.ac.nz/css/docs/Strategic_Briefing_Papers/Vol.3%20Jun%202000/HI.pdf (accessed May 1, 2011).

[2] Nicholas Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, 139.

[3] Michael Ignatieff, ‘State failure and nation building,’ in Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas, edited by J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane,  299-321, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 299.

[4] Nicholas Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, 140.

[5] Francis Kofi Abiew, Evolution of the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999, 149.

[6] Fernando R. Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality, Transnational Publishers, 1997, 237. And Nicholas Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, 144.

[7] For more detail on the way in which the wording of Resolution 688 minimised the humanitarian aspect in favour of the threat to international security, see Francis Kofi Abiew, Evolution of the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention, 151-152.

[8] United Nations Security Council. ‘Resolution 688.’ http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/4658393.26381683.html (accessed April 29, 2011).

[9] The link from the conflict affecting Somalia to international peace and security was not explained by the Security Council in the authorising resolution, and the term ‘international peace and security’ is referred to only once in the document. See: United Nations Security Council, ‘Resolution 794,’ http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/2924885.45179367.html (accessed May 2, 2011).

[10] Nicholas Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, 260.

[11] Ben Feller, ‘Obama Libya Speech Strongly Defends Intervention (Full Text),’ Huffington Post, March 28, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/28/obama-libya-speech-_n_841311.html#text (accessed May 10, 2011).

[12] Kofi Annan, ‘Two concepts of sovereignty,’ The Economist, September 18, 1999, http://www.un.org/News/ossg/sg/stories/kaecon.html (accessed May 5, 2011).    

[13] ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect, December 2001, available at http://www.iciss.ca/report-en.asp (accessed April 26, 2011), VII.

[14] Ibid, 11 and 31.

[15] Ibid, 31.

[16] United Nations General Assembly, ‘2005 World Summit Outcome,’ http://www.un.org/summit2005/index.html, (accessed May 5, 2011), 30. And United Nations Security Council, ‘Resolution 1674 (2006),’ http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/7502864.59922791.html (accessed May 1, 2011).

[17] United Nations General Assembly, ‘2005 World Summit Outcome,’30.

[18] Thomas G. Weiss, ‘The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a Unipolar Era,’ Security Dialogue 35, no. 2 (2004): 140-141, http://sdi.sagepub.com/content/35/2/135 (accessed May 4, 2011). And Gareth Evans, ‘When is it right to fight?,’ Survival 46, no. 3 (2004): 63, http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.auckland.ac.nz/10.1080/00396330412331343733 (accessed May 13, 2011). For an in-depth analysis of the effect of the Iraq war on the concept of humanitarian intervention, see Alex J. Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq, Ethics and International Affairs 19, no. 2 (2005): 37-40, http://search.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.auckland.ac.nz/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=17791096&site=ehost-live (accessed May 2, 2011).

[19] United Nations General Assembly, ‘Implementing the responsibility to protect: report of the Secretary-General,’ http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/category,REFERENCE,UNGA,,,4989924d2,0.html (accessed May 4, 2011). And United Nations Security Council, ‘Resolution 1706 (2006),’  http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/283139.441162348.html, (accessed May 10, 2011), 5. And United Nations Security Council, ‘Resolution 1973 (2011),’ http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/1787758.4695816.html (accessed May5, 2011). And International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘The Crisis in Cote d’Ivoire,’ http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-ivory-coast (accessed May 10, 2011). And Seth Mydans, ‘Myanmar Faces Pressure to Allow Major Aid Effort,’ New York Times, May 8, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/08/world/asia/08myanmar (accessed May 10, 2011).

[20] Fernando R. Teson, ‘Eight Principles for Humanitarian Intervention,’ Journal of Military Ethics 5, no. 2 (2006), 96 http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.auckland.ac.nz/10.1080/15027570600707698 (accessed May 10, 2011).

[21] United Nations, ‘Charter of the United Nations,’ http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/ (accessed April 28, 2011). 

[22] ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect, 13.

[23] Ibid, 15.

[24] Mohammed Ayoob, ‘Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty,’ International Journal of Human Rights 6, no. 1 (2002), 81-82.

[25] United Nations Security Council, ‘Resolution 1973 (2011).’

[26] Michael Byers and Simon Chesterman, ‘Changing the rules about rules? Unilateral humanitarian intervention and the future of international law,’ in Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas, edited by J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, 177-201, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 179.

[27] Michael Byers and Simon Chesterman, ‘Changing the rules about rules? Unilateral humanitarian intervention and the future of international law,’ 179.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Francis Kofi Abiew, Evolution of the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention, 38.

[30] United Nations, ‘Charter of the United Nations: Article 42.’

[31] Michael Byers and Simon Chesterman, ‘Changing the rules about rules? Unilateral humanitarian intervention and the future of international law,’ 180. 

[32] Jennifer M. Welsh, ‘Taking Consequences Seriously: Objections to Humanitarian Intervention,’ in Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations, edited by Jennifer M. Welsh, 52-68,  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, 54.

[33] United Nations Security Council, ‘Resolution 1674 (2006).’

[34] Aidan Hehir, Humanitarian intervention: an introduction, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, 19.

[35] Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, ‘Who’s Keeping the Peace? Regionalization and Contemporary Peace Operations,’ International Security 29, no.4 (2005): 182.

[36] Nicholas Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, 139-140.

[37] Julian Borger, Ian Traynor, and Ewen MacAskill, ‘Gaddafi family deaths reinforce doubts about Nato’s UN mandate,’ Guardian, May 1, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/01/gaddadi-family-deaths-reinforce-doubts (accessed May 5, 2011).

[38] United Nations Security Council, ‘Resolution 1973 (2011).’

[39] New York Times, ‘Syria – Protests (2011),’ updated May 12, 2011, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/syria/index.html?scp=1-spot&sq=syria&st=cse (accessed May 12, 2011).

[40] Anthony Shahid, ‘Syria Arrests Scores in House-to-House Roundup,’ New York Times, May 5, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/06/world/middleeast/06syria.html (accessed April 28, 2011).  

[41] New York Times, ‘Syria – Protests (2011).

[42]United Nations Security Council, ‘Resolution 1973 (2011).’

[43] Neil MacFarquhar, ‘Push in U.N. for Criticism of Syria is Rejected,’ New York Times, April 27, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/28/world/middleeast/28nations.html (accessed May 5, 2011).

[44] Ibid.

[45] The Associated Press, ‘Libyan envoy urges international intervention,’ The Washington Post, February 25, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/25/AR2011022504349.html (accessed May 5, 2011). And United Nations Security Council, ‘Resolution 1973 (2011).’

[46] The Associated Press, ‘US welcomes EO decision on Syria sanctions,’ CBS News, May 7, 2011, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/05/07/ap/politics/main20060746.shtml (accessed May 7, 2011).

[47] The White House, ‘Statement by the President on Syria,’ April 22, 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/04/22/statement-president-syria (accessed May 5, 2011).

[48] Hayley Peterson, ‘Obama: ‘Stretched’ U.S. must relinquish lead in Libya,’ Washington Examiner, March 21, 2011, http://washingtonexaminer.com/politics/white-house/2011/03/obama-stretched-us-must-relinquish-lead-libya (accessed May 5, 2011).

[49] Khaled Yacoub Oweis, ‘Assad holds Syria army despite Sunni-Alawite divide,’ Reuters, April 6, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/06/us-syria-army-idUSTRE73543X20110406 (accessed May 5, 2011). And Central Intelligence Agency, ‘World Factbook: Syria,’ https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html (accessed May 5, 2011).