AWA: Academic Writing at Auckland

In 1492, Columbus sailed to the New World. On arrival, he and subsequent explorers found well embedded, sophisticated and dominant cultures; amongst others, the Aztecs in central America and the Incas in Peru. Yet, within forty years of Columbus’ arrival, subjugation of both these cultures by the Spanish was complete.[1] How such a dramatic capitulation was able to occur in such a short time was a result of multiple circumstances. This essay will argue that a combination of the relative strengths of the Spanish, the relative weaknesses of the indigenous cultures and the devastating impact of diseases, particularly smallpox, all had a part to play in the demise of those cultures. It will focus on the conquest of the Aztec and Incan empires, as they are the two instances which best exemplify the rapid subjugation. Other factors were in play for the subjugation in other areas, such as the Mayans of Central America[2] and the area covered by modern day Brazil and none of these areas succumbed nearly so dramatically.[3] Equally, while the Iberian conquest of Central and South America by definition involved both Spaniards and Portuguese, because the Aztecs and Incan conquests were solely Spanish affairs, only the Spanish influence will be discussed.

It would be nearly thirty years after Columbus’ arrival before a concerted effort to settle mainland Central and South America was attempted by the Spanish. In the interim, Spanish settlement was concentrated on the island of Hispaniola. This period was important for providing a training ground for the Spanish.[4] As Blakewell says, “It was a bridgehead into the new”.[5] The two main protagonists in the conquests were Hernan Cortes and Francisco Pizarro. Cortes was chosen to lead Spain’s foray to Central America. On previous visits, the Spanish had found large cities with substantial, permanent buildings, an established culture, and a confident and skilled military force.[6] Importantly, though, there was tantalising evidence of gold and so it was in that context that Cortes was chosen in early 1519 to lead a force to conquer the territory.[7] After gathering intelligence about the territory and how it was governed, and the state of allegiances to the Aztec state and its leader, Moctezuma, he discovered that there was a significant level of disunity, owing to what were seen as excessive tribute demands from Moctezuma.[8] After a cautious journey, Cortes arrived in Tenochtitlan, the Aztec capital.[9] Ten days later, Cortes took Moctezuma prisoner. In doing so, Cortes reckoned on two things: Moctezuma had not accurately understood the intentions of the Spanish, and Moctezuma held absolute power, such that removing him would deal an important psychological blow to the Aztec’s political system. Both reckonings proved correct.[10] A number of battles was fought over the course of the next year, none of which was conclusive, but all of which gradually wore down Cortes’ forces to the extent that he was on the brink of capitulation. It was at this time that he pivoted to diplomacy.[11] As Blakewell describes it, with a combination of military threat and persuasion, a number of the people in south-east Mexico switched allegiance to Cortes.[12] This built sufficient momentum in Cortes’ campaign at precisely the time that another decisive factor emerged: smallpox. It was an Old World disease which had crossed the Atlantic with the explorers. It arrived in Central America in 1520 and attacked the local population with impunity, striking its leaders and the general populace alike.[13] Its effect was both psychological and physical. The losses suffered were sufficient to turn the tide in favour of Cortes. In August 1521 he captured Tenochtitlan and, with it, the Mexican heartland.[14]

In Peru, there were broadly similar circumstances but they were sequentially the opposite. The expedition was led by Pizarro. He set out in late 1532 heading to Cajamarca, a major northern Peruvian town in the Andes. Like Cortes, he had taken his time to gather intelligence and attacked and seized Atahualpa, the leader of the Incans. In allowing the Spanish to enter the town unmolested, the Incans had committed the same folly of under-estimation that their Aztec counterparts had 12 years earlier.[15] Pizarro held Atahualpa for nine months before executing him. As in Tenochtitlan the psychological effect of the capture of Atahualpa was critical. While it took some time to fully subdue the rest of the population, the important first step was in neutralising a head of state with absolute power. Again, the impact of disease was also critical but smallpox was already present when Pizarro arrived.[16] He therefore encountered a local population which was beginning to succumb to the epidemic and descend into civil war, so that, once the crucial battle at Cajamarca had been won and Atahualpa had been eliminated, the lion’s share of the work had been done.[17] As Cook says, “Weakened by epidemic disease, civil war, and internal dissension, the native peoples of the Andean highlands fell easy prey to European encroachments”.[18]

It is important to discuss the impact of disease and understand why it was so influential in the outcomes described above. The introduction of infectious diseases - predominantly smallpox  was particularly devastating for indigenous populations because they had no prior exposure to it (and therefore had acquired no immunity), and were from a relatively shallow gene pool (and so, once a disease had taken hold, it was extremely virulent).[19] But its influence spread further than just the victims it claimed. Once it took hold, it reduced the number of people who could look after those who were afflicted, leaving many to die of starvation rather from the disease itself.[20] Worse than that, having no previous experience of what it was incited fear and panic in the population. The causes were twofold: they felt that the gods had let them down; moreover, by dint of their immunity, it created an impression of the conquistadors that they were superhuman.[21] It is difficult to discern whether either of the two conquests would have been possible without the influence of smallpox. Inevitably, such a counterfactual can only be a hypothetical exercise. But there is no doubt that its influence was considerable. In preceding Pizarro’s arrival in Peru, it has been described as the “shock troops of the conquest”.[22]

Turning now to why the seemingly robust political structures of the Aztecs and Incans were able to be destroyed in such a short period of time. Militarily, the Spanish held important technological advantages in weaponry. They had steel swords which were more effective than anything their opponents had.[23] They made very effective use of animals: horses were unknown to Indians and combined speed and size to unnerve them. Mastiff dogs, too, were effective. Their noise and ferocity were another thing Indians had never encountered before.[24] Overlaying the “shock and awe” elements of weaponry and animals was a superior grasp of strategy. Spaniards were much more accustomed to attacking the centre of command. To identify in whom this lay, they meticulously acquired intelligence. They were adept at playing rival factions off against each other, sometimes also acquiring them as allies.[25] They were also highly unconventional in their methods, at least by the standards to which the Indians were accustomed. They didn't send ambassadors to announce coming attacks; they fought to destroy rather than take prisoners; they attacked at times which were outside the “season” for fighting.[26] Fundamentally the Indians’ isolation had inured them to thinking that there was only one way to fight. That was to their ultimate cost. Finally, psychologically, the Indians had some critical weaknesses which the Spaniards were able to exploit, both wittingly and not. Quite coincidentally, Cortes arrived at a time when by legend the man-god Quetzlcoatl had foretold he would return, and there is some suggestion that Moctezuma assumed the Spaniards were Quetzlcoatl’s agents.[27] Similarly, as discussed above, the immunity to the diseases which ravaged the Indians conferred on the Spanish some kind of divine status. The clarity of the Spaniards’ purpose – kill, destroy, take booty – put the Indians on the back foot and the Spaniards were able to exploit this.[28] Spaniards, moreover, had had experience during the Reconquista of fighting peoples who did not look like them and did not fight like them.[29] This gave them the advantage of adaptability which the Indians did not possess.[30] Elements such as these had a self-perpetuating effect on both Indians and Spaniards alike. The more the Indians became convinced their gods had deserted them, or that their opponents had some god-like status, the more their confidence diminished. Equally, the obverse was true of the Spanish. As they dealt with each threat they encountered, they grew ever more convinced of their righteousness.[31]

The causes, then, of the rapid demise of the Aztec and Incan cultures were multi-faceted. In one respect, the Spaniards had a number of strengths. They included the recent experience the Spanish had gained from expelling the Moors from the Iberian peninsula (the Reconquista), military, strategic and diplomatic skills, and advantages in weaponry.[32] Their calculations to target the leaders of the two cultures were decisive moments in both cases. In the case of the indigenous populations, the societies were dispersed and lacked unity. Fundamentally, they were not as strategically adept as the Spaniards, making critical errors in misunderstanding their opponents’ intentions. They proved highly susceptible to diseases introduced by the conquerors. Finally, important psychological factors were in play – ones to which the indigenous people fell prey, and which the Spanish were able to recognise and exploit.

Bibliography

Bakewell, Peter, A History of Latin America: c. 1450 to the Present, 2nd ed., Malden, MA, 2004

Bray, Warwick ed., The Meeting of Two Worlds : Europe and the Americas, 1492-1650 Oxford, 1993.

Cook, Noble, Born to Die: Disease and New World Conquest, 1492-1650, Cambridge, 1998.

Chasteen, John Charles, Born in Blood and Fire: A Concise History of Latin America 2nd ed., New York, 2006

Diamond, Jared, Guns, Germs and Steel: a Short History of Everybody for the Last 13,000 Years, London, 1998.

Porter, Roy, The Greatest Benefit to Mankind: a Medical History of Humanity from Antiquity to the Present, London, 1999.

Watts, Sheldon, ‘Smallpox in the New World and in the Old: From Holocaust to Eradication, 1518 to 1977’, in Epidemics and History: Disease, Power and Imperialism, New Haven, 1999.

Footnotes:

[1] Alistair Hennessy ‘The Nature of the Conquest and the Conquistadors’ in Warwick Bray ed., The Meeting of Two Worlds : Europe and the Americas, 1492-1650 Oxford, 1993, p.5.

[2] John Charles Chasteen, Born in Blood and Fire: A Concise History of Latin America 2nd ed., New York, 2006, p.33.

[3] ibid., p.39

[4] Peter Bakewell, A History of Latin America: c. 1450 to the Present, 2nd ed., Malden, MA, 2004, p.79.

[5] ibid., p.78

[6] ibid., p.78.

[7] ibid., p.79.

[8] Bakewell, p.97.

[9] ibid.

[10] ibid.

[11] ibid., p.99

[12] ibid., p.98.

[13] ibid., p.99.

[14] Noble Cook, Born to Die: Disease and New World Conquest, 1492-1650, Cambridge, 1998., p.67.

[15] Bakewell, p.100.

[16] ibid., p.101

[17] Don Brothwell ‘On Biological Exchanges Between the Two Worlds’ in Warwick Bray ed The Meeting of Two Worlds : Europe and the Americas, 1492-1650 Oxford, 1993, p.241.

[18] Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs and Steel: a Short History of Everybody for the Last 13,000 Years, London, 1998, p.77

[19] Cook, p.72.

[20] ibid., p.66

[21] Hennessy, p.18.

[22] Brothwell, p.22.

[23] Hennessy, p.12.

[24] ibid., p.13.

[25] Bakewell, p.104.

[26] Hennessy, p.12.

[27] Bakewell, p.105.

[28] ibid., 106.

[29] Chasteen, p.34.

[30] Diamond, p.80

[31] Bakewell, p.107.

[32] Hennessy, p.5